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Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and
Welfare Analysis*
Oliver E. Williamsont
Until recently predatory pricing1 has been a relatively vague con-
cept in antitrust law. This may be because emotive terms, such as
predatory pricing, do not invite and sometimes defy analysis. But the
lack of precision may also reflect a sense that the familiar tools of
static economic analysis are ill-suited to cope with the issues posed by
predatory pricing. As developed in this article, predatory pricing in-
volves strategic behavior in which intertemporal considerations are
central. Static economic models that fail to capture these attributes
miss crucial features of the predatory pricing issue.
Recently a remarkable degree of consensus in favor of cost-based
rules has appeared in court opinions dealing with predatory pricing.
2
This judicial consensus may be a response to a series of articles ad-
dressed to predatory pricing issues, the most significant being com-
mentary by Edward Cooper and studies by Richard Posner and by
* Research on this paper was supported by the Center for the Study of Organizational
Innovation at the University of Pennsylvania and by a grant from the National Science
Foundation. Work on the final version of the paper was completed while I was a Fellow
at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. Com-
ments by Paul Joskow, Richard Posner, and Donald Turner on earlier versions of the
paper are gratefully acknowledged, as are comments by Industrial Organization Work-
shop participants at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Chicago. Econ-
omists and lawyers in the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice
also commented usefully on an oral presentation of the penultimate version of this paper.
t Professor of Economics, Law, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975), proscribes predatory
pricing as an act of monopolization or an attempt to monopolize. See, e.g., United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 182 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1910). Clayton Act § 2, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), and Robinson-Patman Act § 3, id. § 13a, also proscribe predatory
pricing. The issues are the same under all three provisions.
2. See Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.
1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil
Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 813 (1977); National Ass'n
of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 637-38 & n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714, 723-25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Weber v. Wynne, 5 T ow
REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) IT 61,315 (D.N.J. 1977); Inter City Oil Co. v. Murphy
Oil Co., [1976-1] Trade Cas. If 60,948, at 69,176 (D. Minn. 1976).
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Philip Areeda and Donald Turner.3 Posner and Areeda-Turner
brought the tools of static economic analysis to bear on the problem
and produced a set of cost-based tests for evaluating allegations of
predatory pricing. 4 The Areeda-Turner rules have not only been
embraced by the courts, but have also influenced a Justice Depart-
ment decision to withdraw a suit in progress. 5
Though the Areeda-Turner and Posner studies are important con-
tributions, I nonetheless have serious reservations about them. Both
studies fail to account for two major intertemporal attributes of
predatory pricing. First, although static welfare economics may be
adequate to evaluate a market where there is a shift from one steady
level of supplying a good or service to a second steady level, the same
model can be misleading if the shift in question is temporary or con-
tingent and arguably has the purpose of deterring future rivalry.
Second, and perhaps somewhat more subtle, firms have incentives to
adapt to rules of law. These adaptations must expressly be taken into
account in an evaluation of the economic consequences of a legal rule.
When allowance is made for these dynamic effects, the Areeda-Turner
rules can be shown to have inferior efficiency properties as compared
with the alternative set of rules proposed in this article. In addition,
the alternative rules are more easily enforced and explicitly recognize
the differences between competition among a group of established
oligopolists and the rivalry that occurs between a dominant firm and
new entrants.
Part I begins by providing backgTound on predatory pricing and
gives reasons to be skeptical about the properties of the rules favored
by Areeda and Turner. The efficiency benefits of their marginal cost
pricing rules are questioned on the ground that they may not yield the
immediate social welfare gains that Areeda and Turner attribute to
3. R. POSNERi, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOTIC PERSPECTIVE 184-96 (1976); Arecda &
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary
Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MiCn. L. REv. 373, 435-40 (1974).
4. Important differences should, however, be noted. Areeda and Turner favor a short-
run marginal cost rule while Posner proposes long-run marginal cost as the test criterion.
Compare R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 191-93 with Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 732-33.
5. Former Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper explained the Antitrust
Division's decision to dismiss the Government's antitrust case against two major tire
companies partly on the ground that "[i]t is now clear that any theory of Section 2
liability upon which we could rely in these cases cannot rest upon traditional predatory
conduct, because we cannot demonstrate that the defendant in either case set prices
below marginal or average variable costs." Memorandum for Attorney General Edward
Levi, February 23, 1976, reprinted in 5 TRADE REc. REP. (CCH) I 50,259 (1976) (in relation
to United States v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Civ. No. C-73-836, and United States
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Civ. No. C-73-835 (N.D. Ohio 1976)).
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them and, more importantly, because their proposed rules make no
allowance for strategic behavior by dominant firms.0 An attempt is
then made to remedy the latter shortcoming by developing a model in
which the strategic motivations of firms engaging in predatory be-
havior are expressly acknowledged. The model focuses on predatory
pricing to deter entry into the dominant firm's market, and in-
vestigates the effects of three alternative predatory pricing rules on
prices and output before (ex ante consequences) and after (ex post
consequences) entry (or, more generally, rivalous investment) occurs.
Part II examines the welfare properties of these three alternative rules.
Part III extends the basic model, which assumes that goods and
services are supplied on a continuing basis, to cover equipment that
undergoes significant design changes between successive production
runs ("generational equipment"). A third case, which should be
distinguished from both of these entry variants, is predatory pricing
among established firms. This case is treated in Part IV.
Part V applies the analysis to recent antitrust cases, and Part VI
expressly sets out the proposed rules of law. The article concludes with
a brief examination of the relation between predatory pricing rules
and notions of industrial fairness.
I. Predatory Pricing, Efficiency, and Strategic Modeling
A. The Issues
The existence of predatory pricing has long been regarded with
skepticism by many economists and some lawyers. Without objective
standards defining predatory pricing, allegations of predatory pricing
are easy to level but difficult to evaluate. Further, pricing "below
cost" (variously defined) has been difficult to show empirically.7 Per-
haps most persuasively, predatory pricing is held to be "irrational"
since economic analysis suggests that it is always cheaper for a firm to
acquire rather than to undersell a competitor.8
These arguments, however, are unpersuasive. As Professor Posner
observes, the irrationality position "is convincing only if mergers are
6. Strategic behavior, in the context of predatory pricing, involves not merely pre-
positioning, which is standard to entry barrier analysis, but also contingent responses to
entry. Both need to be examined in an integrated way.
7. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 699 & n.7; Koller, The Myth of Predatory
Pricing: An Empirical Study, ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Summer 1971, at 105.
8. The standard reference on the purported irrationality of predatory pricing is
McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 2 J.L. & Ecox. 137
(1958). For a commentary, see Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15
J.L. & ECON. 129 (1972).
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assumed to be legal, and . . . the illegality of mergers to create a
monopoly has been clear for a long time now." If predatory pricing,
though also unlawful, is more difficult to detect than merger, "preda-
tion may in fact be a cheaper mode of monopolization than acquisi-
tion."'10 Predatory pricing may also be used to influence the terms
under which an acquisition is made" and may be directed less at
destroying extant rivals than at discouraging prospective rivals.12 The
latter point is especially significant. The simple net benefit calculus
upon which the irrationality argument rests can easily be upset if
aggressive responses to entry in one market can have entry-deterring
effects in other markets. If by responding aggressively to a current
threat of entry a dominant firm can give a "signal" that it intends to
react vigorously to entry in later time periods or different geographical
regions, discounted future gains may more than offset sacrifices of
current profit. Signaling, whether intertemporal or interspatial, is
plainly strategic behavior. Areeda and Turner nevertheless model the
predatory pricing issue mainly in static terms.13
B. The Efficiency Criterion
Lest the antitrust laws be invoked as a means to discourage legitimate
rivalry, often as a shelter against inefficiency, workable criteria are
sorely needed for distinguishing between meritorious and defective
predatory pricing claims. Areeda and Turner reject "such empty
formulae as 'below cost' pricing, ruinous competition, or predatory
intent," and instead "attempt to formulate meaningful and workable
tests for distinguishing between predatory and competitive pricing by
examining the relation between a firm's costs and its prices."' 4 Posner
likewise eschews reliance on intent in evaluating claims of predatory
behavior; he argues that intent is an unreliable indicator of market
behavior.15 Without considerable confidence that a manifestly anti-
9. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 185.
10. Id. Cooper makes a similar argument. Cooper, supra note 3, at 436 n.228.
11. Yamey, supra note 8, at 130-31.
12. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 185-86; Note, Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 84 YALE L.J. 558, 564 n.27 (1975).
13. Occasional quasi-dynamic elements do appear, as in their treatment of promotional
pricing. Arceda & Turner, supra note 3, at 713-15. But the central argument and the
main rules are developed in a static framework.
14. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 699-700. Areeda and Turner also "suggest that
extreme care be taken in formulating [predatory pricing] rules, lest the threat of litiga-
tion, particularly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing." Id.
at 699.
15. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 189-90:
A firm with executives sensitized to antitrust problems will not leave any docu-
mentary trail of improper intent; one whose executives lack this sensitivity will often
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competitive marketing plan is disclosed by the documents, and that
the evidence is not just sales executive puffery, an enforcement effort
based on intent is apt to be unrewarding.16
Both Areeda-Turner and Posner repeatedly assert that the "preda-
tory impact" of a price reduction by a dominant firm must be judged
by whether such a reduction will exclude an equally efficient rival.
They presume that competition is running a beneficial course if the
price cut excludes only firms that are less efficient than the dominant
firm. To be sure, the demise of any firm has painful consequences for
create rich evidence of such intent simply by the clumsy choice of words to describe
innocent behavior. Especially misleading here is the inveterate tendency of sales
executives to brag to their superiors about their competitive prowess, often using
metaphors of coercion that are compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naive.
Any doctrine that relies upon proof of intent is going to be applied erratically at
best.
16. Professor Scherer, in responding to Areeda and Turner, argues that cost-based
approaches are simplistic and that a comprehensive appraisal of a complex set of eco-
nomic facts together with an inquiry into the monopolist's intent is needed to reach a
correct predatory pricing verdict. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A
Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869, 890 (1976). Depending on the particulars, Scherer's
"comprehensive reappraisal shows that long term economic welfare is maximized in some
cases when the monopolist's price exceeds its marginal cost and in other cases when
marginal cost is undercut." Id, The particulars involve a determination of
the relative cost positions of the monopolist and fringe firms, the scale of entry
required to secure minimum costs, whether fringe firms are driven out entirely or
merely suppressed, whether the monopolist expands its output to replace the output
of excluded rivals or restricts supply again when the rivals withdraw, and whether
any long-run compensatory expansion by the monopolist entails investment in scale
economy-embodying new plant.
Id. (footnote omitted). Scherer concludes that "I do not know how these variables can be
assessed properly without a thorough examination of the factual circumstances accom-
panying the monopolist's alleged predatory behavior, how the monopolist's officials
perceived the probable effects of its behavior (i.e., intent), and the structural consequences
actually flowing from the behavior." Id.
Although I also urge that greater knowledge of the circumstances is needed than
uniform application of a cost-based standard admits, I am persuaded by Areeda and
Turner's rebuttal that Scherer's approach relies on "long-run possibilities [that] are
intrinsically speculative and indeterminate." Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory
Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L. REV. 891, 897 (1976) (footnote omitted). Scherer evidently
would supplant antitrust enforcement with a price commission. Findings of illegality
would turn on a study of full fact situations, including an examination of whether en-
trants are efficient or not. Where they are, the dominant firm would be constrained to
charge a higher price than where they are not.
The exercise is troublesome on several accounts. Whether a price cut is predatory turns
on whether or not entrants are efficient. (And if they are not, it is an easy step to extend
the argument to consider the possibility that, given a "fair chance," they will be.) How
the dominant firm is to be so apprised is not disclosed. Secondly, whether or not a price
cut is predatory turns on whether it is subsequently reversed. But this involves monitor-
ing for an indeterminate period. Among other things, it would be necessary to investigate
whether a price is reversed or has been adjusted to meet new circumstances (for example,
higher input costs or EPA restrictions). Dominant firm industries are easily converted to
quasi-regulition in the process. But surely the record on price regulation counsels cau-
tion. Rather than slip inadvertently into a regulatory posture-which, experience dis-
closes, is typically hostile toward competition-antitrust is better advised to seek simple
rules enforceable in court.
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the affected employees and investors. Seen in a broader context, how-
ever, the elimination of inefficiency is a leading benefit of competition.
It is crucial to make the distinction between protecting competitors
and protecting competition. Sentiment is a cruel hoax if it leads to
protecting competitors, since the consumer is invariably the loser when
such rules are introduced. An appreciation for the long-run efficiency
benefits of competition is essential if the uncertainty that surrounds
the law on predatory pricing is to be removed and useful rules are to
be developed. 1
7
Predatory pricing should thus be evaluated in efficiency terms. But
whereas Areeda-Turner and Posner invoke static economic analysis
to argue that marginal cost pricing promotes efficiency, this article
formulates the problem in a more general way that makes express al-
lowance for strategic considerations. The basic static economic proposi-
tion to which Areeda-Turner and Posner appeal is that, second best s
and strategic considerations aside, allocative efficiency is promoted by
setting price equal to marginal cost. The underlying argument is that
net social benefits are maximized when marginal social benefits (as
reflected by price) are set equal to marginal social costs. Areeda-
Turner invoke both this condition and the less efficient rival criterion
in arguing for a short-run marginal cost pricing test.1 9
There are technical problems with the less efficient rival claim and
substantive problems with the allocative efficiency aspect of this two-
part argument. The problem with the first part is that marginal costs
are sometimes a poor indicator of total, and hence unit, costs.2 0 The
17. These uncertainties can be a major concern. "[U]ncertainties surrounding the
process and criteria of judicial evaluation may deter much competitive activity that even
courts would have found desirable." Cooper, supra note 3, at 435.
18. Second best refers to the proposition that partial equilibrium analysis (which
focuses on local conditions-e.g., a particular industry, rather than the whole economy)
may be an unreliable indicator of overall welfare effects if sectors other than those being
expressly investigated experience distortions. Though occasionally important, second best
arguments are rarely operational and are commonly set aside. They are ignored in the
remainder of this article.
19. They argue that "[i]f a monopolist produces at a point where price equals
marginal cost, only less efficient firms will suffer larger losses per unit of output," and
that if a firm is forced to charge a price greater than marginal cost, "[o]utput that could
be produced at a lower cost than its value to consumers would be eliminated." Areeda &
Turner, supra note 3, at 711.
20. The types of problems that can arise here have been examined by Rosalind
Seneca in the context of competition between alternative transportation modes. As she
observes and demonstrates, "[a]llocating traffic to the mode with the lowest long-run
[or short-run] marginal cost will not necessarily minimize the total cost of providing the
service." Seneca, Inherent Advantage, Costs, and Resource Allocation in the Transporta-
tion Industry, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 945, 946 (1973) (emphasis in original). To be sure, these
problems may occur infrequently. Nevertheless, the contention that marginal cost prices
accurately reflect relative efficiency is in trouble from the outset.
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second part of the argument raises a more serious problem. Their
allocative efficiency claims do not distinguish between marginal cost
pricing of a continuing kind and temporary cutting of prices to
marginal cost levels for strategic purposes. Marginal cost pricing on a
continuing basis has the optimality properties to which Areeda and
Turner refer. Moreover, temporary price cuts to marginal cost levels
may be warranted by business exigencies other than strategic responses
to entry. As Professor Cooper remarks, "[a]ny sale that returns a
margin above the added cost of making that sale is unimpeachably
sound business practice if it is the best available opportunity.' 21 Both
of these practices, however, must be distinguished from the temporary
cutting of prices to marginal cost levels for the strategic purpose of
deterring entry. Although Areeda and Turner recognize that price
reductions by the dominant firm may be rescinded when the entry
threat vanishes, and express a clear preference for continuous marginal
cost pricing, the only difference in the social benefits that they impute
to permanent and temporary reductions is one of duration.
2 2
An example may help to illustrate the problematic nature of the
optimality properties associated with marginal cost pricing of an oc-
casional, strategic kind. Consider a regulated public utility for which
the regulatory authority, at periodic intervals, examines price-to-cost
relations for the utility to ascertain whether the monopoly franchise
should be renewed. Suppose that marginal cost pricing is favorably
regarded by the authority and that the utility, recognizing this, adopts
marginal cost pricing prior to each franchise review, but reverts to
monopoly pricing as soon as the renewal is issued. How should these
temporary price cuts be interpreted? The immediate benefit of such
temporary price cuts will likely be negligible. Moreover, whatever the
immediate benefits, long-run resource misallocations arguably result
when the utility reverts to monopolistic pricing following each fran-
chise renewal.
The insignificance of the immediate efficiency gains can be demon-
strated by considering three cases: (1) the product or service is non-
storable and consumers recognize that the price cut is merely
temporary; (2) the product is storable but the monopolist is unable
to satisfy the demand for the product caused by the influx of orders
from consumers attempting to increase their inventories; and (3) con-
sumers mistakenly believe that the price cut will be permanent and
adapt their investments accordingly.
21. Cooper, supra note 3, at 437.
22. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 706-11.
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There is little incentive to alter consumption practices under case
(1) because consumers correctly perceive the temporary nature of the
price cut and are unable to accumulate inventories. Here a temporary
price cut mainly causes a transfer of income from the monopolist to
consumers. Allocative efficiency is little affected.
Under case (2) consumers have an incentive to build up inventories
in response to temporary price cuts. But the monopolist can satisfy
these demands only if it has considerable excess capacity. Lacking
excess capacity, a temporary low price can be sustained only by resort-
ing to nonprice rationing-and hence inventory accumulation demands
will go unfulfilled and the allocative effects will again be negligible.
The worst case is (3). If the price cut is thought to be permanent,
when in fact it is temporary, consumers will be misled if they signif-
icantly alter their consumption practices. Negative net benefits can
easily result if consumers incur significant fixed costs in adapting to
what were thought to be permanent, but turn out to be temporary,
changes in relative prices. Whatever the immediate responses to the
price cut, in this example it is obvious that the price cut is merely a
strategem. The regulatory authority is extremely myopic if it renews
the monopoly franchise because prices are equal to marginal costs at
the review interval, especially since more permanent price reductions
could have been made a condition for franchise renewal.
To be sure, most of the dominant firms that are of concern here are
not regulated industries.23 But the example is instructive nonetheless.
The argument that temporary price cuts, whatever their motivation,
yield negligible social benefits applies to regulated and unregulated
firms alike. Areeda and Turner's appeal to social optimality as support
for temporary marginal cost pricing is thus suspect. Furthermore,
putting aside the differences between regulation and antitrust, there is
a striking strategic similarity: the temporary price cut is designed in
both instances to maintain a monopoly.24
Faced with strategic behavior of this kind, the basic question is
23. Charges of sales below cost do, however, arise between unregulated and regulated
firms in the communications industry. The famous Telpak case was of this kind. American
Tel. & Tel. Co. (Telpak), 37 F.C.C. 1111 (1964); 38 F.C.C. 370 (1964). See also Note,
Competition in the Telephone Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86 YALE L.J. 538 (1977)
(examining Bell System's potential for subsidization of competitive services with monopoly
revenues).
24. The example, however, breaks down thereafter. Thus the regulatory agency in the
example is empowered to reassign the franchise itself, while a new entrant into an un-
regulated industry is not awarded a market share but makes inroads by actively con-
testing for sales. Furthermore, regulatory agencies are frequently able to reach and monitor
price agreements on a continuing basis, while antitrust relies on the competitive process
to perform this policing function.
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whether antitrust should tolerate or acquiesce in responsive pricing
by dominant firms confronted by the prospect or fact of new entry,
subject only to the condition that prices exceed marginal cost. I am
inclined to regard price and output responses of a contingent kind-
now it's there, now it isn't, depending on whether an entrant has ap-
peared or vanished-as inherently suspect. At the very least, it would
seem judicious to examine the properties of alternative predatory
pricing rules before concluding that the allocative efficiency properties
of marginal cost pricing on a contingent basis are beneficial.
C. Strategic Behavior
The analysis will be limited to firms that have a clear incentive to
behave in a strategic way toward existing and potential rivals. Firms in
competitively organized industries are exempted because the incentives
are lacking. There is no purpose in sacrificing current profits unless
offsetting gains in other geographical markets or in later periods are
likely, and firms in competitive industries cannot reap these gains .2
Only in dominant firm and collusive oligopoly industries do firms
have a clear incentive to exclude or eliminate rivals. Although be-
havior akin to predatory pricing can appear in loose oligopolies or
even in competitively organized industries, such behavior is caused by
breakdowns in pricing discipline or by personal animus and must be
distinguished from the strategic efforts to acquire long-term market
power that characterize predatory behavior by dominant firms and
collusive oligopolies.
The analysis will be principally concerned with the response of
dominant firms and collusive oligopolies to new entry.20 A dominant-
firm industry can be defined as one in which the largest firm has a
market share of at least sixty percent and entry into the market is not
easy.27 Although only a few industries satisfy this definition for a na-
25. Areeda and Turner expressly recognize this and accordingly rely on the monopoly
model to characterize demand and cost conditions. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3,
at 698-99. Areeda and Turner make frequent references to "the monopolist" on the one
hand and "new entrants and small firms" on the other.
26. Although the model applies to dominant firms and collusive oligopolists alike,
for convenience dominant firm terminology is used throughout the article. The particular
entry barrier model employed is a variant of the entry barrier analysis of Joe Bain and
Franco Modigliani. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NaW COMPETITION (1956); Modigliani, New
Developments on the Oligopoly Front, 66 J. POLITICAL ECON. 215 (1958). I am concerned
with new investment, whether it is made by new entrants or fringe firms, rather than
de novo entry per se. Again, however, it will be convenient to refer to new investment in
new entry terms.
27. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 208-33 (1975). Although the 60% figure is not etched in stone, in defining dominant
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tional market,28 many more industries satisfy the conditions in geo-
graphic markets. In collusive oligopolies, firms are able to maintain an
effective concurrence of market action. This is not, however, nearly so
widespread a condition as is sometimes alleged, 29 but occurs mainly in
mature, highly concentrated industries producing homogeneous prod-
ucts under uniform cost conditions and having significant barriers to
entry.30 Again, a consideration of geographic markets increases the
number of markets that qualify as collusive oligopolies.
Since the welfare attributes of marginal cost pricing rules cannot be
established abstractly, evaluation requires well-specified, operational,
alternative rules. Three propositions guide this evaluation. First, post-
entry welfare differences aside, rules that invite greater pre-entry out-
put restriction and higher-cost supply are plainly less favored. Second,
for any given level of post-entry supply, social gains are realized when-
ever product is supplied at lower cost. Additionally, though less im-
portant and more difficult to characterize with the welfare economics
apparatus used here, rules that require prospective entrants to have
greater knowledge or to bear greater uncertainty are disfavored, ceteris
paribus.
These propositions contemplate two kinds of strategic behavior.
Temporary price cutting to marginal cost levels is transparently a
strategem calculated to discourage current and future entry. This in-
volves reactive (post-entry) behavior. But strategic considerations arise
at the pre-entry stage as well. Each predatory pricing rule gives rise to
pre-entry price, output, and investment adjustments on the part of
dominant firms whose markets are subject to encroachment. To
neglect the incentives of rules whereby dominant firms make pre-entry
adaptive responses of a strategic kind necessarily misses an important
part of the problem.31 Prior treatments are incomplete in that pre-
entry effects are ignored, significant alternatives to marginal cost
pricing rules are bypassed, and welfare effects are dealt with in a
limited and overly sanguine fashion.
firms it must be recognized that disciplining rivals is costly. Only firms with a strong
interest in the future configuration of an industry will be prepared to act unilaterally
to influence such conditions.
28. See W. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 151-53 (1970).
29. As the postwar Japanese and German experiences suggest, oligopolies behave rather
differently from both the prewar holding companies (Zaibatsus) in Japan and the govern-
ment-sanctioned cartel operations in Germany. J. MONTIAs, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC
SYSTEMs 187-90 (1976).
30. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 27, at 234-47.
31. I decided to formulate the problem in this way after reading a prepublication
draft of A. Michael Spence's interesting paper, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligop-
olistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977), in which he investigates the use of capital
investments as a barrier to entry.
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D. Modeling Assumptions
Dominant firms are assumed to be influenced by predatory pricing
rules in the following way: 32 whatever rule is in effect, dominant firms
will invest in plant and equipment in an amount and kind such that
the profits of any entrant, were one to appear, would be reduced to
zero if the dominant firm responded to entry in the most aggressive
manner allowed by the prevailing rule.33 An aggressive (as opposed to
a conciliatory) response involves producing the maximum output con-
sistent with the prevailing rule. Given that investment is determined
with this strategic objective in mind, the dominant firm behaves in all
pre-entry periods by maximizing short-run profits. Pre-entry invest-
ment and post-entry pricing behavior are thus both conditional on the
specification of the predatory behavior rule.
The strategic model assumes that potential entrants are aware of
and understand the economic consequences of entry responses by
dominant firms under whatever rule is in effect. As in most entry
models, potential entrants are assumed to assess their entry opportuni-
ties with respect to a residual demand curve, which shows how much
market demand remains to be satisfied at every price given the
dominant firm's contingent response to entry.34 The location of the
32. Alternative behavioral assumptions that involve no strategic prepositioning (myopic
profit maximization) and sophisticated prepositioning of a probabilistic kind are examined
at pp. 302-04 infra, and footnote 33 infra. As indicated there, few dominant firms are
ignorant of the strategic relation they bear to the industry of which they are a part,
which casts doubt on the assumption of myopia. Expected profit maximization in which
probabilities are taken into account is more plausible. The model in the text easily
generalizes to deal with this condition. The same qualitative arguments apply.
33. The analysis assumes that whenever a predatory behavior rule is specified the
dominant firm will "locate" so that it can act within the law and still render entry
unattractive.
The dominant firm faces the strategic problem of maximizing expected profits, rec-
ognizing that for each predatory pricing rule there is no unique price at or above which
entry will surely occur and below which entry will never occur. Rather, the probability
of entry varies directly with the price established by the dominant firm. Kamien &
Schwartz, Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry, 39 ECONOMETRICA 441 (1971); Williamson,
Selling Expense as a Barrier to Entry, 77 Q.J. ECON. 112 (1963). The analysis, however,
is not greatly changed on this account. All that need be done is to recognize that a
family of residual demand curves will be associated with each predatory pricing rule
and a probability of entry attached to each. The dominant firm will then proceed to
maximize expected profits by reference to these probabilistic demand curves. The same
qualitative results characterizing rule differences, see pp. 295-304 inIra, can be expected.
34. George Stigler, among others, has expressed serious reservations about limit pric-
ing entry barrier analysis. As he puts it, the "ability of the oligopolist to agree upon and
police the limit price is apparently independent of the sizes and numbers of oligopolists,"
whereupon the difficult issues of oligopoly theory are assumed away. G. STIGLER, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDUsTRY 21 (1968). But the analysis presented in this article is expressly
restricted to dominant firms and collusive oligopolists, as defined above. Oligopolistic in-
dustries not satisfying the delimiting conditions given in text are arguably unable to
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dominant firm's response curve depends on the dominant firm's pre-
entry investment, and its shape depends on the prevailing predatory
pricing rule.35
It will facilitate the analysis to make simplifying assumptions of
three kinds. First, it will be assumed that, whatever rule is in effect,
the dominant firm always chooses a plant design consistent with
operating on the long-run average cost curve to which it has access.
This assures that the plant design chosen satisfies rudimentary ef-
ficiency tests. Second, it is assumed that entrants have access to the
same long-run cost curves as established firms.36 Third, it is assumed
that the long-run average cost curve falls in steps rather than con-
tinuously. As will be shown in section B of Part II, relaxing these as-
sumptions mainly buttresses the argument. 37
E. Alternative Rules
Three rules for restraining dominant firms in the post-entry period
will be investigated. The first rule is designated Q -- Q, where Q is the
engage in collective prepositioning and mutual policing as assumed in a strategic reac-
tion curve model.
If dominant firms and collusive oligopolies are the relevant subset, then the basic issue
is whether predatory pricing rules are appropriately described in terms of strategic
response functions. If so, residual demand curves for potential entrants may be obtained
in the manner described below. Academic diferences about entry models and their
limited applicability to certain types of oligopoly thus miss the point. What matters is
whether the strategic considerations are critical and, if they are, if they are adequately
reflected in the modeling apparatus employed.
35. For the purposes of this article, I will assume that the shape of the dominant
firm's response curve is fully determined by the prevailing predatory pricing rule. Thus,
if a marginal cost pricing rule were adopted, the response curve would be the dominant
firm's marginal cost curve. Actually, legal rules place an outer bound on admissible
responses rather than uniquely determine them. The qualitative results obtained below
stand up provided that legal rules have the general effects attributed to them.
36. This ignores a strategic asymmetry between established firms and potential en-
trants. However qualified the latter may be, they have not made the investment in fixed
plant and operating infrastructure that established firms have. Accordingly, new entrants
have to persuade investors to make funds available while established firms are not re-
quired to make similar appeals. Threats by established firms to contest entry vigorously
can thus affect the terms on which capital becomes available to the potential entrant,
while the potential entrant is not able to impose similar costs on the established firm.
Once entry has occurred, entrant and established firm are more on a parity in this
respect-unless entry has occurred in a tentative way (e.g., the entrant has leased general
purpose equipment rather than bought special purpose equipment). The incentives for
the dominant firm to engage in short-run predatory behavior are especially strong where
entry is plainly tentative.
37. I also assume that effective entry can rarely be assured by resorting to long-term
contracting. The dominant firm can be expected to contest pre-entry sales just as it con-
tests post-entry sales. Also, prospectihe customers would be reluctant to jeopardize a known
source of supply before the entrant has irreversibly committed himself by incurring fixed
costs. Finally, long-term contracts are both costly and hazardous. See 0. WILLIAMSON,
supra note 27, at pp. 82-105.
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dominant firm's pre-entry level of output and Q is the post-entry level
of output. This rule, called the "output restriction rule," stipulates
that in the period after entry occurs the dominant firm cannot in-
crease output above the pre-entry level. It is essential to specify the
time period over which the output restriction rule holds. Unless
predatory responses to new entry quickly threaten the viability of the
new entrant, such responses are unlikely to be effective. As discussed
below, the cost disadvantages of new entrants decrease as they ac-
cumulate experience and demonstrate their viability. Ordinarily an
initial restraint period of twelve to eighteen months is sufficient to
allow the entrant to realize cost economies and establish a market
identity. 38 A shorter period would permit the dominant firm to hold
excess capacity as a strategic reserve to be unleashed at the end of the
grace period, and a longer period would pose severe administrative
problems and weaken the incentives of new entrants quickly to achieve
cost parity with the dominant firm.
The second rule, designated P i SRMC (where P is price and
SRMC is short-run marginal cost), permits the dominant firm to in-
crease output in the post-entry period subject to the condition that
price not fall below short-run marginal cost. This is called the
"marginal cost rule." The third rule, designated P - SRA C (where
SRA C is short-run average cost), permits output expansion if the
resulting price exceeds short-run average cost. This is called the
"average cost rule. '3 9
Consider first the price and output of a monopolist not threatened
by entry. These are shown in Figure 1 as P* and Q*, respectively, and
represent the short-term profit-maximizing position. This is the price
and output at which marginal revenue (denoted MR in the figure) is
just offset by, and is thus equal to, the marginal cost of the last unit
sold. Consider now how price and output are affected if dominant
firms are concerned with entry and a predatory pricing rule is in
effect. The three alternative rules and their effect on entry will be
considered in turn.
38. Moreover, the recent entrant is not defenseless but enjoys the protection of the
law, albeit in the capacity of an "established" firm, once the initial period has expired.
The rules appropriate for evaluating predatory pricing among established firms are set
out at pp. 336-37 infra.
39. These rules are not exhaustive. The most conspicuous omission is the proposal
that dominant firms faced with new entry must maintain price until the entrant has had
an opportunity to become established. Such a rule requires dominant firms to hold up a
"price umbrella," which implies an output reduction by dominant firms and is an
invitation for inefficient firms to enter. The inferior welfare properties of a rule having
these implications are, I believe, obvious. See p. 328 9- note 109 infra.
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1. The Output Restriction Rule, Q L Q
The basic rule allows the dominant firm to operate at Q = Q, but
the rule must be qualified by a requirement that the resulting price
exceed average variable costs when output is held unchanged.40 This
qualification will normally be satisfied.41
a. Q=Q
The behavioral assumption on which most entry barrier analysis is
based is that "potential entrants behave as though they expected exist-
40. The operational import of this qualification is slight, however. It mainly allows for
remote contingencies and tidies up the model.
41. Indeed, earlier entry barrier models have ignored altogether the remote possibility
that the post-entry price would fail to cover the dominant firm's average total cost. In-
asmuch as A TC > A VC when the dominant firm is operating at Qo, see Figure 1 and
note 122 infra, the AVC constraint is even less likely to be violated if the dominant firm
holds its output unchanged.
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ing firms to adopt the policy most unfavorable to them, namely, the
policy of maintaining output while reducing the price (or accepting
reductions) to the extent required to enforce such an output policy.
'42
The basic model is shown in Figure 1. The curve D is the industry
demand curve and LRA C is the long-run average cost curve accessible
to existing firms and potential entrants. 43 The curve D' is the residual
demand curve, which shows the amount of demand remaining when
the dominant firm holds its output unchanged. Taking Qo as the
dominant firm's pre-entry output, so that the firm may not supply
more than Qo in the immediate post-entry period (twelve to eighteen
months), residual demand is that part of the demand curve to the
right of Qo. The curve labeled D' represents the horizontal displace-
ment of this residual demand curve to the origin.
Given that the dominant firm chooses investment such that the
prospective entrant can at best earn zero profits on the residual demand
curve, the dominant firm's object is to select Qo such that D' is just
tangent to (never exceeds in value) the long-run average cost curve.
This tangency occurs at the point denoted by T in the figure. Were
the dominant firm to supply less than Qo in the pre-entry period, D'
would be shifted to the right and the new entrant could earn positive
profits under the output restriction rule. If, however, the monopolist
charges the price P0 and produces Qo, the best that a potential entrant
could hope for under the output restriction rule is to break even by
constructing a plant and producing an output of size QT Any entering
firm that produces an output larger or smaller than QT will not be
able to cover its costs, since the residual demand curve lies below the
LRAC curve at all other points.
The dominant firm's pre-entry output and price (Qo and P0, respec-
tively) differ from the unconstrained profit-maximizing position (Q*,
P*) due to the threat of entry. But for the threat of entry, the
monopolist would set marginal revenue (MR in the diagram) equal to
marginal cost 44 by producing an amount Q*, which is less than Qo.
The price at which the quantity Q* clears the market exceeds the
market-clearing price for the quantity Qo, so that P* > Po.
Even though potential competition serves to restrict the monopolist's
profit margins, pre-entry operation at the limit price (P0, Q0) never-
theless yields supracompetitive profits. Only if the monopolist were
42. Modigliani, supra note 26, at 217.
43. If potential entrants have to incur set-up costs, allowance must be made to recover
these during the anticipated production interval.
44. Note that short-run and long-run marginal costs are equal when plant size is ad-
justed optimally to produce the amount Q*.
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to expand pre-entry output to the level Qc, where price is equal to
long-run average cost,4 5 would his economic profits vanish. Although
output at the level Qc is socially preferred to output at Qo, the former
is unattainable short of regulation-which, by assumption, is dis-
allowed.
40
If entry occurs and additional supplies of amount QT are brought
onto the market, the resulting market price (PT) still exceeds the
monopolist's costs of production (at Qo). Thus, although the new en-
trant just breaks even at the point (CT QT), the dominant firm con-
tinues to realize positive, albeit reduced, post-entry profits. Differential
profits between large and small firms in concentrated industries are
thus a predictable consequence of the entry barriers model.4 7
b. Q<Q
In the unlikely event that the new entrant brings onto the market a
quantity of output so large that, if the dominant firm holds its output
unchanged, price is driven below the dominant firm's average variable
costs, the dominant firm (and entrant, if the entrant is selling below
its average variable costs) should be required to reduce output until a
P A VC result is realized.4 8 Absent this stipulation, dominant firms
that held output unchanged irrespective of entry might occasionally
drive prices below remunerative levels in the immediate post-entry
period. The P : A VC requirement forestalls this possibility.
2. The Short-Run Marginal Cost Rule, P " SRMC
Suppose instead that the monopolist is permitted to expand output
when confronted with entry, and that his only restriction is that price
should not be reduced below short-run marginal cost. Assume, for
purposes of evaluating this possibility, that in response to entry the
monopolist chooses to expand output until price precisely equals
45. It is assumed that the demand curve intersects the long-run average cost curve in
the region where LRAC is flat. This seems reasonable for most industries in a large
economy such as the United States.
46. Regulation is beset with numerous difficulties of its own. Where competition can
be made to work reasonably well, it is usually to be preferred.
47. The evidence is consistent with this prediction. See Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief
About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmidt,
H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).
48. See, however, pp. 324-25 for the qualifications that allow entrants to engage in
promotional pricing of short duration for consumer nondurables. Although entrants
might price below average variable costs temporarily under this exception, no massive
market dislocations would be permitted.
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marginal cost. What are the entry and output implications of con-
tingent output responses of this kind?
Figure 2 depicts the relationships with the marginal cost rule in
effect. Since the monopolist is permitted under this rule to respond to
new entry by expanding output,49 he can safely reduce pre-entry out-
put below Qo without inducing entry. The optimum level of invest-
ment is again determined by the residual demand curve. But whereas
previously the residual demand curve was given by D - Qo, now it is
given by D - SRMC, since the monopolist can expand output as long
as price remains above short-run marginal cost. The optimal scale can
be obtained graphically by considering the family of plant scales con-
Price,
Cost
P-
P2
PO
PT
AC2
Pc,ACo
OT aQ2 ati 0o Quantity (0)
49. Plainly the output unchanged rule is not the "most unfavorable" behavior that an
entrant could impute to existing firms in the industry, see pp. 297-98 supra; output ex-
pansion as a reply to entry is more adverse.
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sistent with operating on the long-run average cost curve"° and finding
the horizontal difference between the corresponding short-run marginal
cost curve of each such plant and the demand curve, D. The plant
scale for which there is a point of tangency between the residual
demand curve, thus defined, and the long-run average cost curve
(LRA C) is then the optimal plant scale for the dominant firm. As
shown in Figure 2, the plant scale with SRMC curve yielding this
tangency has minimum short-run average costs at output Q..
Once a plant of this scale is put in place in the pre-entry period, the
monopolist will choose the output that maximizes his profits. This
entails equating industry marginal revenue with the short-run marginal
costs corresponding to plant scale Qu. The monopolist thus produces
the amount Q2 (which is less than Qo) and charges the price P2 (which
exceeds Po). Were entry to occur, however, the monopolist would
respond by operating where price equals marginal costs. This would
involve a movement along his SRMC curve until he reaches the out-
put Qo.51 The prospective entrant, in anticipation of this output
response, will not enter unless price exceeds P2. 52 Thus a prospective
entrant will enter only if the monopolist has chosen too small a plant,
so that his short-run marginal costs exceed PT at output Qo.
3. The Short-Run Average Cost Rule, P t SRAC
A similar investigation can be made of the average cost rule. Inas-
much as the average cost curve is flatter than the marginal cost curve,
the residual demand curve (given by the horizontal difference D -
SRA C)53 is likewise flatter. It will be convenient to assume, however,
that the tangency between the resulting residual demand curve and the
long-run average cost curve remains at the point T, where the cost
curve is kinked. The optimum plant scale is thus that plant scale for
50. For a discussion of long-run cost curves and their relationship to short-run cost
curves, see Viner, Cost Curves and Supply Curves, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE
(1931), reprinted in REAINGS IN PRICE THEORY (K. Boulding & G. Stigler eds. 1952).
51. Market price is determined by aggregate supply. Given that the entrant supplies QT,
the ruling market price will be PT if the dominant firm supplies Q.. The dominant firm's
short-run marginal cost of supplying Qo is PT by construction (otherwise the residual
demand curve would be differently located).
52. The prospective entrant assumes that the dominant firm maximizes profits given
its plant scale in the pre-entry period. Given this assumption, if the dominant firm's
pre-entry price exceeds P,, the dominant firm that responds along its short-run marginal
cost curve will be unable to eliminate positive profits for an entrant that accurately
perceives the industry opportunities.
53. The residual demand curve is here given by the difference D-SRAC because at
any price, P, the most that the dominant firm can supply without violating the average-
cost rule is the quantity where P = SRAC. Hence the entrant is assured that at any price
the amount D - SRAC will be the minimum demand left unfilled by the dominant firm.
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which the short-run average cost curve passes through the point (P,
Q0).
Optimum plant scale under the SRAC rule is necessarily smaller
than Q,.54 Accordingly, the output at which the dominant firm's
short-run marginal cost is equal to industry marginal revenue will be
less than Q2. Pre-entry price will thus exceed P2 .
F. Innocent Profit Maximization
Thus far the analysis of the three predatory pricing rules has as-
sumed that dominant firms position themselves so that they can exclude
potential entrants without violating the predatory pricing rule. But
what if dominant firms do not follow this strategy? Will a change in
strategy call for a different predatory pricing rule? Suppose, arguendo,
that the dominant firm is myopic and simply maximizes profit in
every period without regard to strategic pre-entry positioning or post-
entry extinction of its rival. Is the output restriction rule apt to pre-
clude simple nonstrategic responses of this kind? If so, should it be
abandoned from the outset?
The answer is that nonstrategic or myopic responses by dominant
firms will, under plausible assumptions about the behavior of en-
trants, normally lead to an output reduction (which is a conciliatory
response) by dominant firms, in which case the output restraint will
be satisfied. Thus, consider three scenarios. Although the dominant
firm is assumed to maximize profits with respect to its residual demand
curve under each scenario, the behavior imputed to entrants is as-
sumed to vary.
In the first scenario, the new entrant is assumed to maintain output
unchanged in the immediate post-entry period: it enters at QT and
continues to supply QT during the post-entry interval. The residual
demand curve of the dominant firm is thus the horizontal difference
between the industry demand curve and QT. The dominant firm that
maximizes profits by setting marginal cost equal to the corresponding
(residual) marginal revenue curve will, under this scenario, always
reduce output below what it had supplied in the pre-entry period.
Suppose, alternatively, that the new entrant and dominant firm be-
have symmetrically in that each assumes that its rival will supply an
amount of product in the next period identical to the amount that the
rival supplied in the current period. The corresponding residual de-
54. This follows because the response curve of the dominant firm under the SRAC
rule is the curve SRA C, which is flatter than SRMC and thus allows the dominant firm
to respond to entry by bringing greater post-entry product onto the market than would
be the case if an SRMC rule were in effect, ceteris paribus.
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mand curve of each will then be given by the industry demand curve
less the recent output of its rival. Firms behaving in this myopic
fashion will converge to a solution that implies an output reduction
for the dominant firm.55 Again, the output restraint is redundant.
Suppose, thirdly, that the new entrant treats market price as a
parameter and adjusts output so as to supply at every price the amount
of product that equates price with short-run marginal cost. Suppose,
further, that the dominant firm accurately perceives that the new en-
trant responds to price changes in this way. The residual demand curve
to which the dominant firm now refers is the horizontal difference
between the market demand curve and the marginal cost curve of the
new entrant. The output supplied by the dominant firm after entry
then becomes a function both of the entrant's marginal cost curve and
its own marginal cost curve. The shapes of both marginal cost curves
thus jointly determine whether the dominant firm will supply more
or less product following entry. It is conceivable under these cir-
cumstances that a strategy of equating marginal cost to marginal
revenue on the residual demand curve would lead to an output in-
crease by the dominant firm.50 This is, however, merely a hypothetical
possibility. Operationally it seems unlikely. Not only must the short-
run marginal cost curve of the entrant be of a special kind, but the
immediate post-entry behavior imputed to the new entrant is myopic
and implausible.
It is important to recognize that the current costs of new entrants
normally exceed the costs that the entrant will incur in later periods,
due to the benefits that accrue to experience. Inexperienced but other-
wise qualified firms are often at a disadvantage to established firms in
two respects: they do not have an experienced work force5 7 and they
55. This is the normal Cournot solution. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMiC PERFORMANCE 132 (1971).
56. The qualitative output response of the dominant firm in these circumstances is
indeterminate. It depends on the position and relative slopes of the dominant firm's and
entrant's marginal cost curves and on the industry demand curve.
57. If workers appropriated all of the benefits of idiosyncratic training and experience,
so that productivity differences between experienced and inexperienced work forces would
be fully reflected by wage differentials, the labor force disadvantage of new entrants would
vanish. Alternatively, if wages did not fully reflect the increased productivity of ex-
perienced workers, but the new entrant could raid the dominant firm and hire talent
away easily, the work force disability would vanish. If, however, neither of these condi-
tions were satisfied-which is to say that idiosyncratic advantages are incompletely appro-
priated by workers and wage premiums have to be offered to bring talent from the
established firm to the new entrant-the new entrant would suffer a work force disad-
vantage. As I have argued elsewhere, the incomplete appropriation and wage premium
conditions are common. 0. WILLIAMsON, supra note 27, at 72-78, 216-17. The new entrant
thus often suffers a temporary cost disadvantage until learning-by-doing brings the en-
trant's labor force to a level of experience and productivity comparable to the dominant
firm's.
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may be perceived as high-risk ventures. 5s Post-entry competition com-
monly serves to mitigate both of these conditions. Learning-by-doing
economies accrue to the labor force and experience is often the least ex-
pensive method by which the entrant can convince investors that it
possesses the requisite management talent and perseverance to compete
effectively. Unless, therefore, a dominant firm can arrest and reverse
an entry incursion quickly, the relative costs of continuing a predatory
campaign shift to the dominant firm's disadvantage and the prospects
of successful entry improve.
Given the advantages of perseverence, it seems unlikely that a new
entrant would curb output in order to behave in the manner described
by the third scenario. Rather, the new entrant will maintain or in-
crease its supply in the immediate post-entry period, as assumed by
the myopic dominant firm in the first two scenarios. The myopic
dominant firm (seeking continuously to equate marginal revenue to
marginal cost) thus arguably refers to a residual demand curve that
calls for a post-entry output reduction. The output restriction rule is
therefore redundant if nonstrategic profit maximization is practiced by
the dominant firm.51
58. New entrants may be perceived as high-risk ventures because they are relatively
risky according to an objective standard or because, though they possess the requisite
management and other talents to compete effectively, it is very costly to disclose their
competitiveness in a compelling way to potential investors. Id. at 110-13. An entrant can
make a more compelling case for its competitiveness by presenting evidence of demon-
strated ability to achieve cost control and a demonstrated commitment to persevere under
difficult circumstances than it can using ex ante representations on these matters.
59. A variant of the innocent profit maximization argument is that dominant firms
maximize profits at the point (P*, Q*) in the pre-entry period heedless of the threat of
entry and heedless of whatever predatory pricing rules are declared. Accordingly, pre-
entry price and output are identical for all of the predatory pricing rules. To the extent
that setting price equal to marginal cost in the post-entry period maximizes welfare, the
P MC rule is arguably superior and should be approved.
The argument is troublesome on several counts. For one thing, it assumes that dominant
firms are massively unsophisticated. A more plausible proposition is that persistent
dominance is a prima facie indicator that the dominant firm in question has keenly ap-
preciated the strategic relation it bears to its industry. Dominant firms that price heed-
less of entry will rarely maintain their market positions.
It has been suggested that the Spence model demonstrates that setting marginal revenue
equal to marginal cost in the pre-entry period and price equal to marginal cost in the
post-entry period is the "rational" strategy and that this is exactly what the Areeda-
Turner rules permit. See Spence, supra note 31. The correspondence exists, but the
Spence model assumes that price will be set equal to marginal cost in the post-entry
period rather than demonstrates that this is the unique profit-maximizing strategy.
One of the arguments that Spence invokes in support of the assumption that P =MC
post-entry is that the appearance of a new entrant causes the pre-entry condition of
oligopolistic collusion to break down. Although loose oligopolies may well revert to
marginal cost pricing when entry occurs, the Nash logic upon which Spence relies applies
neither to dominant firms nor collusive oligopolies (of the special kind described in the
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G. Differential Enforceability
In choosing among predatory pricing rules, an important considera-
tion is the relative difficulty of enforcing the rules. An output rule
should be easier to enforce than a marginal cost rule. The ease with
which theoretical cost functions can be used to secure analytical in-
sights should not obscure the very real difficulties encountered in any
attempt to make precise empirical studies of these functions. Standard
accounting costs rarely bear a close relation to an economist's concep-
tion of cost, especially when marginal cost estimates are required.
Since estimates of short-run marginal cost involve an enormous
amount of judgment, a marginal cost test would be a defendant's
paradise. The time period across which costs are to be allocated is
disputable, as is any decision about which costs to include. Allocations
of overhead, especially in a multi-product enterprise, can be juggled,
and inventories can be valued differently under different rules. Either
a standard or an actual cost argument can be made, depending on
which suits the litigant's purposes. The list goes on, as different cost
variances can be treated differently, with each estimate supported by
a plausible, though ad hoc, rationale. The upshot is that estimation of
short-run marginal costs is a mare's nest. It is unrealistic to expect a
judge or jury to sort out the various representations.
To be sure, establishing the admissible level of output (Q) entails
a demand forecast rather than simple reference to pre-entry period
production. Except, however, for products where period-by-period de-
mand is subject to severe stochastic disturbances, this should not pose
a serious problem. The test is especially simple for products that are
sold in many separate geographic markets. Since only one or a few of
these submarkets are apt to occasion claims of predation, the test is
whether output in the suspect markets has increased disproportionately.
In other circumstances a simple trended average of recent sales will
give an estimate accurate to within five percent of realized demands. A
ten percent allowance over the trended projection will be adequate for
text). Restricting attention to these, a post-entry response function of the P = MC kind
can be asserted but it cannot be said to hold uniquely by reason of necessity or com-
petitive self-interest.
Additionally, for the reasons set out above, see pp. 292-95 supra, temporary marginal cost
pricing yields negligible immediate welfare benefits. If alternative rules of a nonprotec-
tionist kind can be devised which less severely deter entry (in other geographic regions or
in later periods) than does temporary marginal cost pricing, net negative welfare con-
sequences may well be associated with reaction functions of the marginal cost kind-
even if dominant firms have made no effort to position themselves strategically in the
pre-entry period.
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most cases, 60 and such an allowance will scarcely permit the dominant
firm to effect a massive market dislocation of the kind a marginal cost
rule would often permit. Business planning records and industry fore-
casts can be examined for corroboration of the trended estimates, and
more sophisticated demand projection tools are available if needed.
Thus the output rule, although not problem free, is eminently more
enforceable than the marginal cost rule (or even the average variable
cost surrogate) favored by Areeda and Turner.61
II. Welfare Evaluation of Predatory Pricing Rules
As is characteristic of most applied welfare economics studies, the
analysis in this Part focuses entirely on a local condition-in this case,
60. Special circumstances can be imagined where appropriate demand adjustments
would be difficult to make. For example, an oil embargo may give rise to a temporary
spurt in natural gas sales. I am unaware of predatory pricing claims in such circumstances
and have no reason to believe that such claims typically have arisen or will arise in cir-
cumstances involving an unusual demand shift.
61. The argument has been made that it is optimal to require the dominant firm to
hold output unchanged in the event of entry. The question arises whether it is optimal
to place the same restriction on the dominant firm's other activities, such as selling ex-
pense or research and development. The answer is no, though for somewhat different
reasons.
The output restriction rule has the twofold purpose of giving new entrants a threshold
opportunity to become established and of discouraging dominant firms from ominously
holding excess capacity in reserve. Dominant firms may hold up the introduction of tech-
nological developments for strategic purposes, but the risks of holding completed develop-
ments off the market for very long are severe. Since trade secrets are fugitive and rivals
are apt to market a similar product before the dominant firm, this contingency does not
appear to be very serious. In any event, technological developments held in reserve would
be difficult for courts to evaluate and control. Moreover, research and development
spending in response to new entry will rarely pose an immediate threat to the viability
of new rivals. Rather, research and development responses should be interpreted mainly
in the context of long-run rivalry, in which case it seems reasonable to exempt research
and development and other long-run manifestations of rivalry from antitrust control over
predatory behavior-subject only to the usual long-run cost recovery stipulation. (The
usual controls on patent infringements, trade secret pirating, etc., would, however, con-
tinue.)
Selling expense, on the other hand, arguably does have short-run impact. Should it
be regarded symmetrically with output, adding a constraint S < S (where S is selling ex-
pense and S is the level of selling expense in the pre-entry period) to the Q < Q rule?
Although this proposal has superficial appeal, the purported symmetry between selling
expense and output is mistaken, since selling expense is really an alternative to price
reductions as a means of influencing post-entry sales. The dominant firm would be
permitted to choose any combination of price and selling expense consistent with the
condition that price exceeds short-run marginal costs when output remains in the Q _ Q
range.
A possible exception might be warranted where selling expense is thought to have
pernicious social effects. This is, however, more difficult to ascertain than is commonly
believed. Indeed, such products will presumably be subject to special controls prior to any
effort to enter, in which case additional entry restraints are not needed. Note, moreover,
that selling expense is simply an unproductive way by which to discourage entry in most
homogeneous product and/or producer good industries. Except for consumer good in-
dustries where products are heavily promoted to emphasize real or imagined differences,
selling expense vanishes as a predatory technique.
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on the industry in which a risk of predation is believed to exist. Sec-
ond order interactions between this industry and other parts of the
economy are ignored. The object of the inquiry is to ascertain dif-
ferential welfare effects attributable to the three alternative predatory
behavior rules set out in Part I. Social benefits will be taken to be the
area under the demand curve between the origin and the quantity
of goods that is sold. This area represents the gross gain that con-
sumers receive from the product. Social costs will be interpreted in
terms of opportunity costs: costs are defined as the value in their best
alternative employments of the resources used to supply the product.
It will simplify the analysis, and will have no effect whatsoever on the
qualitative nature of the results, to assume that social costs are ac-
curately reflected by the pecuniary costs incurred by the dominant
firm and new entrants to the industry. 2
A. Application
Two kinds of effects of predatory pricing rules must be examined.
First, what is the effect of each rule on pre-entry welfare? This aspect
of the problem has previously been neglected. Second, how do the
rules affect post-entry supply? Although prior treatments have dealt
with this second question, the issues have not been developed expressly
in terms of the differential effects of proposed rules on the cost of
post-entry supply.
1. Pre-Entry Welfare
The pre-entry welfare differences among rules can be examined in
two parts: an output effect (will more or less output be supplied if a
rule change is made?); and the cost of supply (do the average costs of
supplying product differ under alternative rules?).
It will be convenient to use the output restriction rule as the
standard by which to evaluate the welfare effects of adopting different
rules. With the output restriction rule in effect, pre-entry supply will
be Q0 and the corresponding average costs will be ACo. As discussed
62. No corrections (by reason of externalities, factor rents, or the like) to the cost
curves shown in the preceding section are thus required for social cost accounting. To
be sure, this is a simple- apparatus and a variety of refinements can be introduced. See
Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay,
9 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 785 (1971). It is noteworthy, however, that defects in the apparatus
are more severe if measures of total welfare are attempted (e.g., should the product be
supplied at all) rather than, as here, with an examination of the marginal welfare
differences attributable to rule changes. Differential welfare effects are much less af-
fected by measuring rod defects when the welfare measures of interest involve evaluating
the incremental effects of rule changes on prices and quantities within a local region.
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earlier,03 permitting firms to respond to entry under the marginal cost
rule induces the dominant firm to reduce pre-entry supply from Qo
to Q2, whereupon price increases from P0 to P 2. But the costs of supply
also change. Pre-entry product is supplied at an average cost of AC.,
under the marginal cost rule, and AC 2 exceeds A Co.
The pre-entry welfare losses of shifting from the output restriction
rule to the marginal cost rule are shown in Figure 3. The area A, is the
loss resulting from output reduction; the area A 2 is the loss attributable
to the higher average cost. Plainly, the output restriction rule is
superior to the marginal cost rule in terms of pre-entry welfare.
The average cost rule can be evaluated in the same way. The rule
causes further output reductions in the pre-entry period, and the
average cost of supplying the reduced amount of product will exceed
ACo. The average cost of supplying product in the pre-entry period
under the average cost rule may or may not exceed A C2. If the average
costs do not exceed A C2 ,
0 4 the average cost rule may or may not be in-
Figure 3
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Cost
P2 -................................
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02 Q Quantity (0)
63. See pp. 300-01 supra.
64. If the SRAC curve for the small plant scale that obtains under the average cost
rule is merely a horizontal displacement to the left of the SRAC curve that obtains under
Vol. 87: 284, 1977
Predatory Pricing
ferior to the marginal cost rule in pre-entry welfare loss respects. It is
plainly inferior, however, to the output restriction rule.
2. Post-Entry Welfare
Recall that the product supplied by the dominant firm in the post-
entry period is Qo under each of the rules. Also recall that the entrant
supplies QT in the post-entry period under each rule. Total post-entry
product (Qo + QT) is thus identical under all rules.65 The welfare
differences among the rules turn entirely, therefore, on cost differences.
Since the entrant's costs of supply are identical for all three rules
(namely ACT = PT), the cost differences among the rules depend en-
tirely on the costs incurred by the dominant firm in supplying Qo. The
relevant cost relations are shown in Figure 4. The average cost of
supplying Qo under the output restriction rule is A Co. When the
marginal cost rule is in effect, average cost will be A C02, which exceeds
A Co but is less than P,- When the average cost rule is in effect, the
Figure 4
Price,
Cost
SRMC2
SRAC,
AC=pSRAC
2ACO - SRAGo
LRAC
Pc,ACo
s0 Quantity (0)
the marginal cost rule, average costs will be lower than under the marginal cost rule since
marginal cost under the marginal cost rule will intersect marginal revenue at a value that
is closer to the minimum point on the SRAC curve.
65. It will be shown, see p. 315 infra, that this an artifact of the stepwise long-
run average cost curve that has been constructed.
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average cost of supplying Qo will be A C0
3 , which is equal to PT.06 Since
ACo <A C 0 2< A C0
3 , there is a clear post-entry welfare ordering of
rules, whereby the output restriction rule is superior to the marginal
cost rule, which in turn is superior to the average cost rule. Moreover,
a rank ordering of rules according to the average variable cost of
supplying Qo in the post-entry period-which arguably is the better
measure of social cost 0 7-will normally yield an identical result.
3. Conclusion
The output restriction rule is thus superior to the alternative rules
with respect to both pre-entry and post-entry welfare. The marginal
cost rule is probably superior to the average cost rule in its effect on
pre-entry welfare and is clearly superior in its effect on post-entry
welfare. The partial equilibrium welfare analysis thus yields the follow-
ing rank ordering of rules: the output restriction rule is best; the
marginal cost rule is probably second; and the average cost rule is
probably third.
B. Extensions
The partial equilibrium analysis in the preceding section has, neces-
sarily, been based on numerous assumptions. Although all possible
complications cannot be considered, this section will discuss three
issues: the welfare implications of Areeda and Turner's average vari-
able cost formulation of the marginal cost rule; the effects of informa-
tion needs and uncertainty on the ordering of the rules; and the wel-
fare effects of relaxing the three simplifying assumptions made in
Part I.
1. Average Variable Cost
In view of the difficulties in measuring marginal cost, Areeda and
Turner suggest the substitution of average variable cost as a surrogate
66. A rough interpretation can be made of these post-entry costs of supply. Entry, if
it occurs at all, involves supplying incremental product in the amount QT under each of
the rules (given the assumptions of the model). The object of the dominant firm in each
case is to react to entry in such a way that the entrant's profits are reduced to zero. This
will occur if post-entry market price is driven down to PT, which requires that aggregate
post-entry product in the amount Q0 + QT be supplied. The dominant firm thus supplies
post-entry product of Q, whichever rule is in effect. The reference coordinates (PT, Q") are
therefore identical for each predatory pricing rule (in the sense that the curves Q = Q,
SRMC 2, and SRAC, all must pass through this point). Given this common reference point,
the relations among the cost curves all follow by construction.
67. The social costs of supplying Qo are the real costs incurred in the process. These
include user costs of capital, but exclude depreciation of plant and equipment that is
independent of utilization rates. Average costs include capital charges of both kinds, but
average variable costs include only the former.
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for marginal cost.°s Average variable cost is everywhere lower than
average total cost. Hence, if the average variable cost rule were adopted
the response function of the dominant firm would be flatter than
under the average cost rule. Pre-entry output would be lower (hence
pre-entry price would be higher) under the average variable cost rule.
The average variable cost curve that passes through (PT, Qo) cor-
responds to a smaller plant scale and higher average total costs (eval-
uated at Qo) than is shown by the curve SlA C3.1° Hence, if the
dominant firm chooses a plant that allows it to charge PT (and thus
deter entry) while still meeting a test that price exceed average variable
costs, the firm will produce less in the pre-entry period and its cost will
68. Areeda &: Turner, supra note 3, at 716-18, 733.
69. These cost relations can be shown graphically as follows:
Price,
Cost SRAC4
AVC4
SRAC3
SRAC ----- ----------
SRAC,.pT -
00 Quantity (0)
Note that for A VC, to pass through the point (PT, Q,), as required, the corresponding
short-run average cost curve (SRAC4) is displaced to the left of SRAC3. Accordingly, the
cost of supplying Q, if the cost curve is of type 4 exceeds that of supplying Qo if the cost
curve is of type 3 instead.
The Yale Law Journal
be higher in the post-entry period than under the other three rules.
Altogether, the average variable cost rule, plausible though it appears,
has the worst welfare properties of all.
2. Information and Uncertainty
The prospective entrant can form expectations relatively easily when
the output restriction rule is in effect. The dominant firm may re-
duce output in response to entry. But the "worst" that it will do is
hold output unchanged. Even recognizing that the rule allows for a
trend adjustment of the maximum output, Q, which will be necessary
in a growing market, the maximum output allowed the firm will be
relatively easy to establish.
Where either a marginal cost or average cost rule is in effect, how-
ever, the prospective entrant also needs to know the dominant firm's
response curve (SRMC or SRAC as the case may be). This is a much
more demanding knowledge requirement and, since such cost curves
can only be approximated, an additional estimating error appears in
the prospective entrant's calculations, adding a further source of risk.
These same cost estimation difficulties, moreover, complicate litigation
and increase uncertainty if either of the cost-based rules is in effect
because the court must ask whether lower-bound cost conditions were
really violated. This can be very difficult to establish-as Cooper re-
marks70 and as both Areeda-Turner 7' and Posner72 concede.
Finally, even if a potential entrant knew with certainty the dominant
firm's response curve, the curve merely reflects a constraint. The
constraint places a limit on the dominant firm's post-entry behavior,
but does not uniquely determine it. Under the output restriction rule,
the output of the dominant firm will either be reduced or remain
unchanged. With either of the cost-based rules in effect, output may
increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. The greater latitude for
dominant firm reaction permitted by the cost-based rules introduces
greater uncertainty for the potential entrant.
3. Simplifying Assumptions
Recall that three simplifying assumptions were introduced to
facilitate modeling: the potential entrant and dominant firm were
assumed to have access to the same long-run average cost curve; the
dominant firm was assumed to choose a technology consistent with
70. Cooper, supra note 3, at 438.
71. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 716-18, 733.
72. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 189-91.
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the long-run average cost curve; and the long-run average cost curve
was assumed to be a step function. This section considers the welfare
ramifications of relaxing these three assumptions.
The assumption of identical cost curves was a modeling convenience
but may be at variance with the facts. To the extent that learning-by-
doing yields operating cost savings or differential risks give rise to
capital cost differences between new entrant and established firm,73
the new entrant will not have immediate access to the identical cost
function as the dominant firm. So long, however, as these cost dif-
ferences are no greater when the output restriction rule is in effect
than under either of the cost-based rules, the ordering of rules will be
unaffected. And arguably cost differences will be less under the output
restriction rule since entry risk is greater under cost-based rules.
The assumption that the dominant firm chooses a technology con-
sistent with the long-run average cost curve favors the cost-based rules.
Suppose that the dominant firm is governed by the marginal cost
predatory pricing rule. The issue that was suppressed is whether the
dominant firm might select an inferior technology if this gives it access
to a more "advantageous" response curve (in the sense that the result
is higher pre-entry profits). The dominant firm's problem can be
formulated as follows: from among the family of plant designs with
short-run marginal cost curves passing through the coordinates (PT,
Qo), choose the plant design that maximizes pre-entry profits. As
shown in Figure 5, in these circumstances a plant design with a rela-
tively flat average cost curve (A C2) may be preferred to the efficient
plant design with a more steeply sloped cost curve (A C1).
74 Given the
greater flexibility to respond to entry afforded by the flat average cost
curve, the dominant firm may realize greater profit in the pre-entry
period by restricting output more than it otherwise would.75 Pre-entry
output is smaller, and social welfare is reduced, if plant of type 2
rather than plant of type 1 were to be constructed.
73. See pp. 303-04 and notes 57 & 59 supra.
74. For an early treatment of these types of cost curve choices in terms of risk and
plant flexibility, see Stigler, Production and Distribution in the Short Run, 47 J. POLITICAL
EcoN. 305 (1939), reprinted in READINGS IN TIE THEORY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 119 (W.
FelIner & B. Haley eds. 1951).
75. As is evident from the discussion of residual demand curves, see pp. 310-11 supra,
a flatter cost curve always permits the dominant firm to make a greater post-entry output
response if cost-based rules are in effect, ceteris paribus. But flatter (more flexible) cost
curves can be realized only by sacrificing plant specialization. Inasmuch as a more
specialized plant affords lower costs when the plant is operated at design capacity, the
revenue benefits attributable to the greater pre-entry output reduction permitted by a
more flexible plant are eventually offset by the greater costs implied by an unspecialized
plant.
313
The Yale Law Journal
Figure 5
Price,
Cost
MG, c
PT -- -- -- -- ----- - ----- - ----- - ------ AC,
AC,
-o Quantity (0)
Plainly, however, this is a rather risky strategy. Should an entrant
appear with requisite capacity at an efficient scale, the monopolist
would find that his inefficient plant placed him at a competitive dis-
advantage. Accordingly, strategic selection of plant designs in which
plants off of the long-run average cost curve are actively considered
has been ignored. The tradeoff between pre-entry profits and post-
entry hazards was settled decisively by sacrificing the former in favor
of strict avoidance of the latter. This is an arbitrary assumption. To the
extent that dominant firms are prepared to run such risks, the welfare
effects need to be taken into account. But the incentives to select in-
ferior technologies, which plainly exist when cost-based rules are in
effect, vanish if the output restriction rule is in effect.76 An inferior
technology is attractive only if post-entry output expansion is per-
mitted; the output restriction rule disallows this. The welfare ad-
vantages associated with the output restriction rule are thus reinforced
when the assumption that dominant firms must choose plants on the
long-run average cost curve is relaxed.
Consider finally the effect of relaxing the assumption that the long-
76. Conceivably the dominant firm will select a "flexible" plant for the reasons given
by Stigler, supra note 74. But there are no response function incentives for the firm to
do so under the output restriction rule.
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run average cost curve is a step function. The step function assumption
is attractive because it is realistic77 and because it facilitates the
analysis. The analytical advantage is that the residual demand curves,
which vary with the predatory behavior rule in effect, have a common
tangency at the point (PT, QT) under this assumption. 78 Were the
long-run average cost curve to decline smoothly throughout, the tan-
gency would vary, there would no longer be a common dominant firm
post-entry output of Qo, and welfare effects would be more com-
plicated to evaluate.
Given a smoothly declining average total cost curve, rules that cause
flatter residual demand curves (as the cost-based rules do) will be
tangent to the long-run average cost curve at a lower price and larger
output. The pre-entry output of the dominant firm will be further
reduced for cost-based rules than for the output restriction rule. Post-
entry output (of dominant firm and new entrant taken together), how-
ever, will be greater under the cost-based rules.
Although the pre-entry welfare advantages of the output restriction
rule are unambiguously greater when the tangency point varies among
the rules, the post-entry welfare effects may (but need not) favor the
output restriction rule. A weighted average of these two effects would
probably preserve the rule ordering, however, since entry (and hence
post-entry adaptations) is presumably the exception in industries given
to the type of strategic behavior investigated here. Thus the pre-entry
effects are likely to dominate.
III. Entry into Generational Equipment Industries
The discussion has assumed that the commodity is in continuous
production and that improvements in product and process are intro-
duced gradually. The changes resulting from these improvements are
assumed to be of degree rather than kind. Although some sales of the
improved product will be to new customers, most of the sales will be
to current users-to renew intermediate product inventories, to replace
damaged or worn-out durable items, or to continue consuming non-
durables.
Yet there are a few products for which simple renewal or replace-
ment sales rarely occur. This is the case where new product embodies
77. The step function reflects the fact that discrete technologies become available at
higher levels of output that are infeasible at all lower levels. Changes in kind cause dis-
continuities in long-run average cost curves, thus turning the continuous curve into a
step function.
78. This is obviously arbitrary. For a large enough shift in the residual demand curve,
tangency might not occur at the point (Pr, QT), and a new technology would be adopted.
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significant technological improvements. Existing product is displaced
by the superior technology; successor generations of product render
the earlier model obsolete.
Consider in particular the case where the dominant firm introduces
a new line of equipment and completes its production run before rivals
imitate the line and offer substitute products. Assume that the product
is durable and has several years of useful life before being displaced by
a successor generation of equipment that embodies superior technology.
Also assume that the product is initially leased rather than sold. What
marketing behavior by the dominant firm shall be regarded as non-
predatory during the period between termination of production and
the appearance of the new technology?
A. Market Clearing at Q + A
Let the stock of equipment produced by the dominant firm be Q.
Assume that the costs of leasing and servicing this stock are negligible
and that the dominant firm is prepared to sell the entire stock at
whatever nondiscriminatory price the market will bring. If no addi-
tional product appears, market price, denoted P(Q), is then P(Q),
which corresponds to the intersection of the demand curve and the
quantity Q. Suppose, moreover, that the dominant firm places its en-
tire stock on the market whatever the state of the market.79 The
dominant firm effectively becomes a price taker. If demand is un-
changed and new entrants bring incremental output of an amount A
onto the market, market price will be given by P(Q + A), which is less
than P(Q).
When new entrants anticipate that the dominant firm will not take
product off the market in the face of entry, entrants will have access
only to the residual demand curve to the right of Q. Additional
product can be sold only by attracting new customers and selling more
product to existing customers, the demands for both of which are
represented by the portion of the demand curve to the right of Q.
Moreover, entrants' output decisions effectively determine price. The
amount of product that they place on the market determines aggregate
supply and hence market price. Entrants will presumably supply the
amount of additional product that maximizes their profits given that
they are optimizing with respect to the residual demand curve.
In Figure 6, if the industry demand curve is D1, then D', will be the
residual demand curve and the entrant (or firm "imitating" the
79. That is, the entire stock is put on the market despite shifts in demand, new
product supplied by entrants, or other factors.
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dominant firm's new generation of equipment) will be indifferent
between producing zero output and producing QT. There is, however,
a welfare gain, shown by the shaded region, if the imitator produces
QT under these circumstances. The market price, to both dominant
firm and imitator, will be PT. If instead the market demand curve is
D2 and the dominant firm has discontinued production after the stock
Q has been completed, the residual demand curve will be D' 2 and the
entrant can earn positive profits by producing Q,,S0 in which case the
price falls from P2 to P,. Special rules that prevent the dominant firm
from selling Q on whatever terms the market will bear have significant
welfare implications if, as is commonly true of specialized equip-
80. Qr is assumed to be the profit-maximizing output for the imitating firm. The en-
trant will earn positive profits on any output within the region where the residual de-
mand curve, D',, exceeds the long-run average cost curve.
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ment, the value of the dominant firm's stock of product is negligible in
its best alternative use. Any rule requiring the dominant firm to
maintain its price at pre-entry levels prevents utilization of product
that can be used at zero social cost. Although price maintenance rules
yield private gains to new entrants, social losses result.
Suppose, however, that a price maintenance rule is in effect and
that the demand curve is D2. Before entry the market-clearing price
for the stock Q is P 2. The relevant demand curve for the new entrant
is then a kinked demand curve that is horizontal at P2 between 0 and
and follows D2 thereafter. The corresponding marginal revenue
curve will have a discontinuity at Q. Suppose, moreover, that the new
entrant is not able to maximize its profits by equating marginal
revenue and marginal cost because it has a capacity limit of Qr. (where
QE < Qr < Q). If the new entrant then offers product at a price P 2 - C,
where e is a small number, while the dominant firm is constrained to
offer product at the price P 2, the entrant will sell QL of product at an
average social cost of ACo while the dominant firm will sell approxi-
mately Q - Qr, of the product at a social cost of zero. Essentially no
additional product is sold, even though the aggregate stock of product
available for sale is increased by QL, since the dominant firm retires
stock in an amount QL as a result of the price maintenance rule.
Absent a special justification for such a price maintenance rule, a
waste of valuable resources plainly results, since without the price
maintenance rule the dominant firm would sell its entire stock, Q, at
zero social cost, and additional product in the amount QE would come
onto the market bringing incremental welfare gains.Si More generally,
any rule, price maintenance or otherwise, that prevents the dominant
firm from selling Q at the prevailing market price is tantamount to a
rule stipulating that some part of Q be placed on the shelf or scrapped.
Such rules waste goods having social value.
B. Possible Exceptions
Might there be countervailing considerations not yet taken into
account that would justify a policy of forced retirement of assets? Two
appear plausible. First, a dominant firm confronted with a price main-
tenance rule might be induced to produce and offer more product for
sale in the pre-entry period.82 Pre-entry social gains would thereby
81. The incremental welfare gains are given by the area under the residual demand
curve between the origin and Q, less the costs of supplying QE.
82. The dominant firm must form expectations about how much product new entrants
will bring onto the market as a function of the pre-entry stock in order to optimize
production. Presumably the amount of product supplied by entrants varies inversely with
the stock of product supplied by the dominant firm.
Vol. 87: 284, 1977
Predatory Pricing
result, although this assumes that the dominant firm will still find it
attractive to develop and produce a new generation of equipment
under a P = P rule. This last assumption is problematic. The mag-
nitude of pre-entry gains must in any event be weighed against the
previously described losses entailed by a post-entry price maintenance
rule.
A second possible justification is the "infant firm" argument. The
general infant firm argument would presumably take the following
form: preventing the dominant firm from selling Q at the market
price (for example, permitting it to sell only Q - 8) when new entry
appears will permit entry to occur on a larger scale than would other-
wise be feasible; entry at this larger scale is needed for the new en-
trant to become a qualified innovator (or earlier imitator) of original
equipment; future period gains on successor generations of equipment
would thus be realized if the dominant firm is constrained to hold its
price at or near the pre-entry level (which effectively requires it to
retire product). This is a rather bold argument that entrants may
invoke in a self-serving way. Areeda and Turner have characterized
arguments of this genre as "intrinsically speculative and indetermi-
nate," and have argued that "[n]o suitable administrative rules could
be formulated to give them recognition." 83 Although the argument
may be valid in special circumstances, 4 these are surely the exception
and not the rule.
Besides being speculative, the claim that technological progress will
be promoted by protecting infant firms does not establish that welfare
gains result. Do the discounted future period benefits more than offset
the immediate losses that involuntary asset retirement by the dominant
firm would entail? Where the prospects for future gains from innova-
tion are small or problematic, a policy of forced retirement of product
in support of infant firms seems dubious.
Another disability is the cost of enforcing the rule. If a requirement
of involuntary asset retirement is to be the exception rather than the
rule, those industries considered to be exceptions must be identified
in advance or dominant firms will not know how to behave lawfully.
Identification of these exceptions will be difficult even at a single point
in time, much less over time. Although specific investigation of
dominant firm industries in national markets would be possible be-
83. Areeda & Turner, supra note 16, at 897.
84. Conceivably an underdeveloped country might decide to impose special restraints
on established multinational firms if, by assisting indigenous firms, the skills needed to
hasten development would be promoted. System gains would thus offset the local losses
caused by an infant industry rule.
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cause the number of such industries is relatively small, it would be
impracticable to investigate and declare exceptions for the much larger
number of local and regional geographic markets with dominant firms.
Finally, even if agreement could be reached in advance, a special
predatory pricing rule for those industries declared to be exceptions is
a questionable way of promoting greater pre-entry output or future
technological progress. Alternative instruments for promoting com-
petition and technological progress in these industries-including ex-
plicit subsidies, affirmative incentives for dominant firms to spin off
technological ventures, or, possibly, dissolution 86-are apt to be as or
more effective.
A policy of involuntary asset retirement under circumstances of the
kind described in this section is a dubious undertaking. At the very
least, those responsible for public policy formation in this area should
(1) recognize the hazards of declaring exceptions and (2) give serious
consideration to other public policy alternatives for promoting the
intended benefits.
C. Voluntary Retirement of Product
If regulation were costless, public policy would presumably require
that the dominant firm sell its entire stock of product, Q. Any policy
permitting the dominant firm to retire stock voluntarily runs the risk
of causing welfare losses. Valuable assets with significant social value
could be shelved or scrapped. But if regulatory solutions are disfavored,
the possibility that the dominant firm will voluntarily retire product
in the face of new entry must be entertained.
7
A policy requiring a dominant firm to sell its entire stock in the
face of entry will probably be a redundant constraint-although
dominant firms confronted with such a requirement may produce less
than they otherwise would in the pre-entry period. Voluntary asset
retirement by a dominant firm faced with entry is an accommodating
posture. Entrants may interpret asset retirement as an invitation to
make further inroads, with the result that the dominant firm will have
to retire even more product to prevent price deterioration. Where ac-
commodation is anticipated to lead to substantial output increases by
85. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 27, at 192-207.
86. See id. at 223-26.
87. This is especially likely to occur if the demand for the product in the range Q +A
is inelastic. It is sometimes argued that monopolists will never set price in the range
where demand is inelastic. This ignores the fact, however, that dominant firms sometimes
price with an eye to entry. Also, even if pre-entry demand elasticity exceeds unity, post-
entry demand elasticity (evaluated at Q+ A) may be below unity.
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entrants, dominant firms may eschew a policy of voluntary asset re-
tirement and instead sell Q at whatever price the market will bring.
IV. Predatory Pricing Among Established Rivals
There are three cases in which predatory pricing may be directed at
established rivals. The first involves price cutting by established firms
in a mature, but nevertheless loosely disciplined, oligopoly. The second
involves price cutting by firms in an industry still in the early stages
of development. The third case is the use of promotional prices by
firms attempting to enter a new market. Each poses distinctive
problems.
A. Loose Oligopoly
The loose oligopoly condition can be further broken down into
stable demand (or slow growth) and declining demand cases. In neither
case do established firms have incentives to engage in the strategic
prepositioning practiced by dominant firms or collusive oligopolists
anticipating entry. Hence the concern that predatory pricing rules will
influence pre-entry investment is irrelevant for loose oligopolies. In-
stead, cost-based rules are needed. The question then is what rule is
appropriate for each condition.
1. Stable Demand
Any of a number of disturbances can upset pricing relationships
among established oligopolists. For the most part, the ensuing price-
cutting episodes do not occasion public policy concern. A predatory
pricing issue arises only if price cutting persists and there is an indica-
tion that one or more firms is relying on a deep pocket in an effort to
force the exit of some firms from the industry.
The appropriate test in such a situation is that prices should be
remunerative. In the very short run this means that the price-cutting
firm should never drop prices below average variable costs. An average
variable cost test poses special hazards, however, if firms in the in-
dustry have different technologies. Firms that are more capital inten-
sive will have lower average variable costs, ceteris paribus, since they
have more fixed (nonvariable) capital costs. Since these firms may not
be the most efficient firms in the industry, sustained low prices should
be required to cover short-run average total costs. Where prices are
maintained at low levels indefinitely, such prices should prospectively
recover all costs in the long run.
Thus although a cost-based test is appropriate when there is sus-
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tamined price cutting, neither short-run marginal cost nor its surrogate,
average variable cost (which are the test criteria proposed by Areeda
and Turner), is suggested. Rather, the relevant test is one of remuner-
ative pricing. An average cost test both sorts out the efficiency of firms
more accurately"" and poses fewer problems of estimation by litigants.
The efficiency advantage is that low-cost firms that are either labor
intensive (and thus have high variable costs) or lack deep pockets will
not be jeopardized by an average total cost pricing test. Only high-cost
firms will be forced to exit. The cost estimation advantage is that all
costs are taken into consideration. This scarcely assures a determinate
result, but much of the accounting discretion allowed by a short-run
marginal or average variable cost test is nevertheless reduced.
2. Declining Demand
The declining industry is a special case. Objectively viewed, some
firms will have to exit. Efficiency is served if those with high out-of-
pocket costs are forced to go early. Firms with specialized plant and
high fixed costs, but low out-of-pocket costs, will remain. Society
gains because the firms that are earliest to exit are those with the
highest opportunity costs. An average variable cost test is thus appro-
priate.8 9 It is noteworthy that the only case for which the Areeda and
88. Posner also makes this point, but not without considerable terminological con-
fusion. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 192. Thus he objects to the Areeda-Turner short-run
marginal cost test because it purportedly
ignores the fact that short-run marginal cost is lower than long-run marginal cost
... even when there is no excess capacity. In the short run, marginal cost does not
include interest, rent, depreciation, and other overhead items, because they do not
vary in the short run with the amount of output produced, but they are part of the
long-run marginal cost of production, which is why a firm's short-run marginal cost
is normally lower than its long-run marginal cost.
Id. at 191-92.
This last reflects confusion between average total costs and average variable costs on
the one hand and long-run marginal costs and short-run marginal costs on the other.
See Scherer, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 991 n.90 (1977). Posner's statement would be
correct if average variable cost is substituted for short-run marginal cost whenever it
appears and average total cost replaces long-run marginal cost. The statement is technically
incorrect, however, as it reads. The relevant distinction between short-run marginal costs
and long-run marginal costs is a temporal one. In the short run plant scale is fixed.
Producing successively more output from a fixed plant involves more intensive utilization
of variable factors-multiple shifts may be introduced, scrappage rates may increase,
scheduling problems and bottlenecks develop, etc.-with the result that the incremental
cost of supplying the last unit easily becomes great and exceeds the cost of supplying this
unit if plant scale were increased appropriately. Contrary to Posner, short-run marginal
costs exceed long-run marginal costs at production levels that exceed design capacity. Sec
G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 156-58 (3d ed. 1966); Viner, supra note 50.
89. This may be refined to require that price exceed short-run marginal costs as well.
But this is a technical refinement, the operational significance of which may be ques-
tioned.
Predatory Pricing
Turner tests and those proposed here agree is the very special case of
a declining industry.
B. Early Stage Growth Industries
Perhaps the most difficult case to assess is the industry that is still
in an early stage of development. Demand is growing rapidly, often
accompanied by technological improvements of a significant kind.
Firms that entered early and were profitable under excess demand
conditions, but are unable to realize cost economies or maintain the
progressive pace, may have to be "shaken out." This is a painful process
and may occasion predatory pricing suits. The question is what
criteria to apply.
The basic dilemma is that although firms with deep pockets may
entertain dominant-firm aspirations and may attempt to accelerate the
demise of small rivals by resorting to predatory pricing, there is a
great risk that-since truth is especially difficult to ascertain in the
early stages of growth-unmeritorious charges of predatory pricing
will be brought by marginal firms. Lest the forces of economic natural
selection be held in check by the application of rules designed to deal
with more settled states of affairs, a double test is proposed. First, a
remunerative pricing test should be applied to the would-be dominant
firm. Since costs may fall rapidly in the early stages of an industry's
growth, a price should be assumed to be nonremunerative only if it is
below current costs as reduced to account for future unit cost reduc-
tions. 0° The second part of the test would require that the plaintiff
demonstrate that it can attain cost levels competitive with the de-
fendant firm's costs. A requirement of current cost equivalence be-
tween the would-be dominant firm and the plaintiff would be too
severe, since nondominant firms may become effective competitors if
given a reasonable chance. Firms experiencing substantially higher
costs relative to other small rivals should be disqualified from bringing
predatory pricing suits.91
90. This is to allow for the possibility that costs may be falling rapidly as a result of
(static) scale and (dynamic) learning-by-doing economies. If today's price does not cover
yesterday's costs but exceeds tomorrow's, how is the price to be evaluated? Even a profit-
maximizing monopolist might set current price below current costs if future costs (and
possibly future demand) are beneficially affected. Surely, however, a price is presump-
tively nonremunerative if it is below current costs as reduced by the discounted value of
future unit cost reductions attributable to incremental current supply.
91. A variant that may arise in demonstrating cost effectiveness concerns the case
where the plaintiff procures an essential component from a vertically integrated rival.
Achieving cost parity may then be complicated if either the internal transfer price and
the market price of the component differ or if supply reliability differs between internal
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C. Promotional Pricing
Charges of predatory behavior are normally brought by entrants
rather than established firms, but local firms with large market shares
sometimes complain of predatory pricing when multimarket firms
attempt to enter their territory. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co.9 2 is a conspicuous example. Promotional pricing thus raises the
question: should a new entrant be allowed to stage a promotional
campaign that violates the cost-recovery test?
93
Areeda and Turner characterize a promotional price as
a temporary, low price designed to induce patronage with the
expectation that the customer will continue purchasing the prod-
uct in the future at a higher [presumably cost-recovering] price.
The promotional price may be below cost and is most easily
illustrated by the seller who gives his product away without charge
to some or all would-be customers.94
Such promotions may be the only effective way to overcome customer
habit in industries where the product is differentiated by manufac-
turers. It is widely conceded that a promotional pricing exception may
be warranted for products that are not, or are not perceived to be,
homogeneous.9 5
Although a promotional pricing exception would relieve the entrant
of the need to satisfy a remunerative pricing test from the very outset,
and external users. Inasmuch as the object is to sort on efficiency, both nonintegrated
and integrated firms need be evaluated on comparable terms.
This assumes that the nonintegrated firm is prepared to make firm contracts with the
integrated supplier. It is unrealistic to expect delivery in spot markets on terms that arc
equivalent (in price and regularity of delivery) to those that the integrated firm makes
when product is transferred between internal divisions.
Furthermore, the integrated firm is not required to transfer products between divisions
on market terms. To the extent that it does not and cost parity becomes an issue in
litigation, an adjustment is plainly warranted for evaluative purposes.
92. 386 U.S. 685 (1967). For discussions, see R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 194; Areeda &,
Turner, supra note 3, at 726-27.
93. Two caveats are warranted. First, the industry may experience an unanticipated
fall in demand, in which case full-cost recovery may be temporarily infeasible. Second,
the relevant costs for the entrant are those that will obtain after allowance has been
made for unusual start-up expenses for administration, manufacturing, and distribution
(though possibly not promotion).
94. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 713.
95. For a thoughtful discussion of promotional pricing and admissible dominant
reactions thereto, see Areeda & Turner, sup'a note 3, at 713-16. Cooper also notes that
below-cost pricing for promotional purposes warrants an exception. Cooper, supra note
3, at 437.
It should also be recognized, however, that product differentiation complicates the
problems of welfare evaluation enormously. Consumers may or may not benefit by the
additional product variety that an entrant offers. The discussion of promotional pricing
in the predatory pricing literature presumes that greater variety is beneficial. The
presumption is followed here.
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such relief would be strictly temporary. The time limits on a promo-
tional pricing effort would vary with the product and would re-
quire marketing expertise to establish. Only a few rough guidelines
for a promotional pricing exception will be offered here. First, promo-
tional prices to industrial users should rarely be necessary (a few
"demonstration" sales, perhaps, excepted). Appeal on the basis of the
merits of the product should ordinarily be feasible from the outset.
Second, promotional pricing for consumer durables is a doubtful
undertaking, since repurchase will not occur for some time and imita-
tion is apt to be a lagged and uncertain process. Consumer nondurables
thus appear to be the area where promotional pricing is apt to be most
attractive. The allowable length of a promotional pricing campaign
for consumer nondurables should vary directly with the expected shelf
life of the item. This may vary from a few weeks to, perhaps, a few
months. But in no case should entrants expect to be able to effect
massive market dislocations under the aegis of below-cost promotional
pricing.96 Only competition on the merits would warrant this; con-
tinued supply at a price below cost may be regarded as an indication
of predatory intent on the part of the entrant and is presumptively
unlawful.
V. Recent Cases and Commentary
Two types of predatory pricing have been distinguished in this
article. One involves predatory pricing in relation to new entry. The
basic model, set out in Parts I and II, applies to products supplied
continuously. This model was then extended in Part III to consider
generational equipment industries. The second type involves preda-
tory pricing directed against established rivals. The loose oligopoly (in
both steady-state and declining industries), growth industry, and pro-
motional pricing conditions each warrant separate treatment within
this category. These were examined in Part IV. Three cases are
examined here, illustrating four of these five conditions (omitting the
growth industry situation).
A. Rivalry Among Established Firms: Loose Oligopoly
The recent case of Hanson v. Shell Oil Co. 9 7 was a challenge to
predatory pricing in a loose oligopoly. Hanson argued that in 1961
96. As Commissioner Elman observed when the Clorox case was before the FTC, a
dominant firm "might tolerate the obtaining of a small foothold by a new entrant, but
[it] can hardly [be expected to] sit by while a large share of the market is absorbed by
the newcomer." Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1534, 1552 (1963), rev'd, 358 F.2d 74 (6th
Cir. 1966), rev'd and remanded, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
97. 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Shell began a program to recover lost market shares in certain south-
western states, where Shell's market share was about ten percent,t5 by
engaging in unlawful price competition. 9 The Ninth Circuit observed
that "Hanson presented no evidence which would suggest that the
'specific intent' to monopolize existed."' 00 But the court took the
argument further. Citing Areeda and Turner, the court held:
To demonstrate predation, Hanson had to show that the prices
charged by Shell were such that Shell was foregoing present profits
in order to create a market position in which it could charge
enough to obtain supra-normal profits and recoup its present
losses. This could be shown by evidence that Shell was selling its
gasoline at below marginal cost or, because marginal cost is often
impossible to ascertain, below average variable costs.'
The court further counseled that predatory pricing claims should
not be upheld when they are used in a protectionist manner:
The antitrust laws were not intended, and may not be used, to
require businesses to price their products at unreasonably high
prices (which penalize the consumer) so that less efficient com-
petitors can stay in business. The Sherman Act is not a subsidy for
inefficiency. Hanson's failure to show that Shell's prices were be-
low its marginal or average variable cost was a failure as a matter
of law to present a prima facie case under § 2.102
The possibility that the antitrust laws can be used in a protectionist
way to discourage price rivalry was plainly recognized by the court
and equally plainly rejected. Although the court's reliance on an
average variable cost test was inappropriate considering the duration
of the pricing conduct, 10 a cost-based test is necessary in a loose
oligopoly to ascertain whether predation is present and, of equal im-
portance, to prevent the predatory pricing law from being used as a
shelter for inefficiency. In steady growth industries such as in Hanson,
predatory pricing can be identified as sustained pricing below average
total cost.
98. Id. at 1360.
99. Id. at 1355.
100. Id. at 1358.
101. Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 1358-59 (footnote omitted).
103. As pointed out above, see pp. 321-22 supra, an average variable cost test does not
adequately sort out the relative efficiency of firms with differing intensities of fixed
assets.
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B. New Entry: Standardized Product and Promotional Pricing
Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.1 0 4 illustrates the issues that
arise when new entry is attempted in a standardized product industry.
The Purex complaint raised a number of issues, including an allega-
tion that Procter & Gamble (P&G)-Clorox had unlawfully encroached
on Purex territories along the West Coast, but the "conclusive" in-
dication that Clorox engaged in predatory behavior involved its
response to the Purex entry in Erie, Pennsylvania. 1°5 Inasmuch as
Purex was a new entrant into this geographic market and the product
in question was a consumer nondurable, Purex was presumably entitled
to the temporary latitude afforded promotional pricing. And indeed
Purex did use special promotions to launch its entry into this market.
104. 419 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The district court's decision was part of a long
litigation precipitated by Procter & Gamble's (P&G) acquisition in 1957 of the Clorox
Chemical Company, makers of Clorox bleach. Id. at 933. The Federal Trade Commission
ruled that the acquisition acted "to foreclose effective competition in the industry" and
thus violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Procter & Gamble Co., 63
F.T.C. 1465, 1569 (1963), rev'd, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd and remanded, 386 U.S.
568 (1967). The Commission ordered P&G to divest itself of Clorox within one year of
the final order. Id. at 1585-87. The Sixth Circuit set aside the Commission's order,
Procter & Gamble v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd and remanded, 386 U.S. 568
(1967), but the Supreme Court reinstated the decree. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967). As a result, in 1969 Procter & Gamble was forced to divest itself of
Clorox. 419 F. Supp. at 933.
Purex, Clorox's leading competitor in the bleach business, then brought a private
treble damage suit under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), against P&G and
P&G's wholly owned subsidiary, the Clorox Company. 419 F. Supp. at 933. Purex alleged
that P&G and Clorox had violated not only § 7 of the Clayton Act (the issue previously
determined by the Supreme Court), but also sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975). The district court held that the Supreme Court's adjudica-
tion of the § 7 violation only established that the effect of the P&G-Clorox merger "'may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. " 419 F. Supp.
at 933 (quoting Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)) (emphasis supplied by court). Since
a plaintiff in a § 4 treble damage action must show that he is "injured in his business
. . . by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), the
court held that Purex had to show actual injury in addition to violation of § 7. 419 F.
Supp. at 934.
Thus the court's opinion considered almost exclusively the issue whether the admitted
§ 7 violation, the P&G-Clorox merger, caused actual damage to Purex. P&G-Clorox's
conduct in the Erie market, see note 105 infra, only went to the issue whether Purex
was damaged by actions Clorox could not have undertaken absent the merger. Id. at
941-42. The consideration of the alleged Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975),
violation was relegated to two paragraphs at the end of the opinion. This does not
affect the analysis in text since the court's discussion of the Erie incident, 419 F. Supp. at
940-42, addressed itself to P&G-Clorox's alleged "anticompetitive predatory practice
designed to prevent a new competitor from getting a foothold in the [Erie] market." Id.
at 940.
105. 419 F. Supp. at 940-42. Irwin Stelzer, an expert witness for Purex, testified on
cross-examination as follows: "I focused really on Erie . . . . [T]hat was considered the
terrific example of what dominant firms shouldn't be allowed to do." Trial Transcript
at 2726-A.
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It was not alleged that these promotions were excessive; 100 the only
litigated issue was whether the response by Clorox was unlawful.
Purex took several positions on the predatory pricing claim, one of
which was that Clorox should not be permitted to charge a price or
incur promotional expenses that yield a net loss. 0 7 The more basic
question under the output restriction rule, however, is whether Clorox
increased its sales in response to the Purex incursion. If Clorox had
increased its sales of bleach above its accustomed volume, a presump-
tion that this was a contingent response expressly designed to defeat
entry would be warranted. Without such an increase, Clorox could be
presumed instead to be conducting business at a steady level that
would continue, entry or not.108
In addition to a remunerative pricing test, Purex also took the
position that dominant firms (Clorox had a pre-entry market share
in Erie in excess of sixty percent) have an obligation to accom-
modate entry.10 9 Since bleach does not lend itself to product innova-
tions of a significant kind and Purex was a well-established producer
of bleach in other geographic areas, no infant firm argument for the
protection of Purex can reasonably be made. Rather, the argument
reduces to a naked theory of umbrella pricing-in order to ensure the
viability of a new entrant, the dominant firm is expected to maintain
price. Since Purex was bringing additional (and substantially identical)
product onto the market, P&G-Clorox would evidently be required to
reduce output in an offsetting amount, in order to maintain price,
under the theory of competition advocated by Purex. That the new
entrant may be a high-cost supplier or that the dominant firm will
hold excess capacity in these circumstances are evidently of no account.
This approach is ill-advised. It makes the easy but egregious mistake
of protecting competitors rather than competition."10
106. But the size of Purex's promotional expenditures was at issue in the case. Purex
apparently spent over $3.00 per case of bleach sold on advertising and coupon discounts,
while Clorox responded with expenditures and price reductions of about $.90 per case.
419 F. Supp. at 940. The court noted that it is an accepted principle in the business com-
munity "that an established firm may use all fair means to protect its market," and found
"nothing reprehensible or anticompetitive in the Clorox response" because "an unusually
large attack may be expected to elicit a comparable response." Id. at 941. The court did
not, however, address the lawfulness of the response in terms of either output or cost.
Under the proposed criterion a Q < Q test would have been appropriate.
107. Plaintiff's Opening Brief, Part II, at 183-85.
108. Clorox prices during the introductory interval when the Q< Q constraint is in
effect should, of course, cover its average variable costs.
109. These views are set out in remarks made by Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, an expert wit-
ness for Purex. Trial Transcript at 2452-53. This testimony was summarized by the
plaintiff's attorneys as holding that "a newcomer must be given a chance to get estab-
lished before the dominant firm responds." Plaintiff's Opening Brief, Part II, at 183.
110. Note that the output restriction rule is not an umbrella rule. It is sometimes mis-
takenly argued that the rule Q < Q is essentially equivalent to the rule P > P, where the
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C. New Entry: Generational Equipment
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp."' illustrates
the issues that arise when an entrant offers a product with a short life
cycle by imitating the design of a device for which the dominant firm
has discontinued production.1 2 Again, although a number of conduct
matters were raised in the Telex case,"13 the basic issue was the exis-
tence of predatory pricing. Although it oversimplifies, I will take it as
given that (1) IBM's production of the computer peripheral device in
question was terminated before entry appeared" 4 and (2) the device
latter is plainly a price umbrella rule. This purportedly follows since price and quantity
are inversely related through the demand function (as price increases, less of the product
is demanded).
The error arises over a confusion between firm and market conditions. The output
restriction rule applies to the dominant firm. But if the output of the dominant firm is
unchanged (Q = Q) and the entrant brings the quantity A onto the market, the dominant
firm must reduce its output in response to entry if it is to hold its price unchanged. In a
market for a homogeneous product, the post-entry output of the dominant firm will be
Q - A if the entrant supplies A and the P = P rule is in effect. Thus under the P = P rule
the dominant firm makes a place for the entrant, while under the Q!< Q rule the entrant
must make a place for himself if the dominant firm refuses to be conciliatory.
111. 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), afj'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part,
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
112. It is not entirely clear from a reading of Judge Christensen's opinion in Telex
whether or not IBM's production of disk drives was fully completed when IBM cut its
price. Also, the price cut was selective rather than general. IBM was experiencing in-
creasing competition for its 2314 disk drive from plug compatible substitutes (including
the Telex 5314 disk drive). Rather than cutting the price on all 2314s or allowing 2314s
returned to IBM because of plug compatible competition to accumulate in storage, IBM
decided to reconfigure the 2314, adding certain control functions, and market the resulting
2319A subsystem at a reduced price. A two-price system thus resulted: IBM maintained
the price on those 2314 subsystems for which customers were willing to renew leases,
while at the same time reducing the inroads made by plug compatible peripherals by
marketing the 2319A at a lower price. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp.,
367 F. Supp. at 291-96.
The assumption for the purposes of this analysis is that IBM had essentially completed
production of the 2314 prior to the price reduction and that the cost of reconfiguring
returned 2314s and adding control functions was a small fraction of the original manu-
facturing cost. Inasmuch as new plug compatible peripherals are designed to complement
successive generations of computers, and given the assumptions stated above, the gen-
erational equipment model in Part III would appear to be applicable. (If the facts should
turn out to contradict the assumptions in significant degree, however, a further analysis
of the economic implications beyond those set out here would be warranted.)
113. The district court found IBM guilty of monopolization and attempting to
monopolize in five specific respects:
1. The announcement and institution of the 2319A disc storage facility in September
1970.
2. The announcement of the 2319B disc storage facility in December 1970.
3. The announcement of the Fixed Term Plan long-term leasing program in May
1971.
4. The announcement and implementation of the Extended Term Plan, which was
also a leasing plan, in March 1972.
5. IBM's pricing policies with regard to its memory products during 1970 and 1971.
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 900 (10th Cir. 1975),
aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
114. See note 112 supra.
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had negligible value in its best alternative (nonperipheral) use. The
question facing the courts was what pricing latitude should IBM (and
other dominant firms similarly situated) be permitted in the face of
entry by firms like Telex.
The welfare analysis of Part III discloses that, leaving aside infant
firm issues, IBM should lease its entire stock of completed product
(Q) at whatever price would clear the market. New entrants would
invariably prefer that dominant firms be required to maintain their
prices, because umbrella pricing facilitates easy entry. The misalloca-
tive effects of such pricing, however, argue against the adoption of an
umbrella rule. Insisting that established firms must maintain their
pre-entry prices until entrants are thought to be well established,
despite the consequences of equipment retirement, comes perilously
close to arguing that, whatever the efficiency consequences, more firms
are always preferred to fewer in dominant firm industries.
Might an infant firm exception be warranted? Technological innova-
tion is an important feature of the electronic data processing industry.
Suppose, arguendo, that alternative antitrust instruments" 5 are un-
available for promoting technological progress. Assume, moreover,
that dominant firms receive adequate advance notification, and hence
are aware of the bounds of lawful behavior. Three factors must be
assessed to determine whether an exception is warranted. First, had
Telex (or other peripheral manufacturers) made significant tech-
nological innovations? Second, are there structural factors that incline
such firms to be leaders or followers? And third, if the answers to either
of these questions disclose actual or potential leadership, would the
gains from innovation be sig-nificant?
A complete answer to each of these questions is beyond the scope of
this article, but a tentative evaluation is possible. The record in Telex
indicates that Telex had mainly been a follower." 6 Also, there are
structural reasons to believe that this may have been the "natural"
posture for peripheral manufacturers to adopt.1 7 Even if an argument
115. See p. 320 supra.
116. See the chronology of product introductions by IBM and Telex in Telex Corp. v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 271-72 (N.D. Okla. 1973), a! 'd in
part and rev'd in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
117. The main frame manufacturers originate successive generations of new central
processing units. compatible peripherals are usually designed in the process. Leadership
in peripheral design thus accrues naturally to firms responsible for state-of-the-art ad-
vances in central processing units. Furthermore, "entry was initially easy for peripheral
equipment manufacturers because they could choose to copy only proven successful prod-
ucts." Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 286. Con-
siderably more detailed knowledge of the industry is needed, however, before these issues
can be settled definitively.
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could be made that imitators have technological leadership potential,
this does not establish that welfare gains will be realized by requiring
dominant firms to maintain price when confronted with entry. Such
an involuntary asset retirement policy yields net welfare gains only if
the discounted future benefits of such a policy exceed the immediate
welfare losses. The issues in Telex were never addressed in these terms.
VI. Rules of Law: Prior and Proposed
Areeda and Turner conclude their examination of the predatory
pricing issue by proposing a series of rules, the most relevant of which
are the following:
1. ...
(b) A price at or above average cost should be deemed non-
predatory even though not profit maximizing in the short run.
(c) A price at or above reasonably anticipated shortrun mar-
ginal and average variable costs should be deemed nonpreda-
tory even though not loss-minimizing in the short run.
2. Recognizing that marginal cost data are typically unavailable,
we conclude that:
(a) A price at or above reasonably anticipated average variable
cost should be conclusively presumed lawful.
(b) A price below reasonably anticipated average variable cost
should be conclusively presumed unlawful. 11
The Areeda-Turner rules do not distinguish predatory pricing in
response to entry and predatory behavior among established firms.
This distinction is basic; the rules of law proposed below expressly
recognize it. The basic Areeda-Turner rules are formulated as marginal
cost pricing tests, although Areeda and Turner concede that marginal
cost is difficult to estimate and therefore offer average variable cost
tests as an alternative. The rules proposed below eschew reliance on
marginal costs.
A. Entry
The merits of the predatory pricing rules proposed below turn
jointly on the efficiency arguments developed in earlier sections of this
article and on the fairness attributes discussed in Part VII, which
follows. Some perspective on the rules may nevertheless be gained by a
brief recapitulation of their properties:
118. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 732-33.
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(a) the output restriction rule, even without an accompanying
remunerative pricing test, represents a relatively severe re-
straint-certainly more severe than cost-based rules that permit
dominant firms to offer contingent product in response to
entry;
(b) the remote possibility that the output restraint will not by
itself preclude nonremunerative pricing in the immediate
post-entry period can be forestalled by additionally stipulating
that the dominant firm shall not price below its average vari-
able costs; 119
(c) although the dominant firm is relieved of the output restric-
tion when the initial (eighteen month) restraint period has
expired, it is simultaneously subjected to an average total cost
remunerative pricing test, which assures that deep pocket con-
siderations will not influence viability in the long run;
(d) finally, promotional pricing exceptions aside, new entrants
face two-stage remunerative pricing tests identical to those set
out in (b) and (c) above.1
20
119. The argument that marginal cost should be the appropriate lower bound on
prices is rejected for three reasons. First, the purported allocative efficiency benefits of
marginal cost pricing are problematic in the short run. See pp. 287-92 supra. Second, even
assuming that marginal cost could be estimated to the satisfaction of the litigants, in-
volving the courts in a marginal cost pricing test implies using the antitrust laws to
effect fine tuning. This is an undertaking of dubious merit. See note 16 supra. Third, the
operationality of a marginal cost pricing test is seriously in question. See note 124 supra.
120. As indicated, see p. 325 supra, entrants should not expect to effect massive
market dislocations as part of a promotional entry effort. The special latitude afforded
promotional pricing is merely intended to facilitate initial acceptance. Thereafter, a
remunerative pricing test should apply.
It should be recognized that any entry effort-promotional or not-that combines a
capital intensive technology (and hence low average variable costs) with deep pockets
poses a potential difficulty. Conceivably, the entrant could offer product in the im-
mediate post-entry period on terms that fully satisfy the remunerative pricing terms
specified in rule 2.1, see p. 337 infra, while the dominant firm, with a less intensive
technology, would be unable at the same price to recover its average variable costs. Lest
the spirit of the remunerative pricing rules be abused (with counterproductive con-
sequences), entrants attempting to exploit such average variable cost differences should
be required to demonstrate that their cost advantages hold with respect to average total
cost as well. If the latter test is failed, intermediate-term pricing at a level not less than
that of the minimum average variable costs of the dominant firm could be stipulated.
The viability of otherwise efficient dominant firms during the early post-entry period
would not, therefore, be jeopardized.
The case can be made that new entrants should be granted a learning curve exception
of the kind discussed in note 90 supra. The problem with this is that the necessary cost
projections are difficult to make. Accordingly, there is a serious risk that new entrants
(large or small) will abuse any such provision. I am inclined for this reason to restrict
learning curve adjustment to early growth stage industries.
Although the issues addressed in this footnote are mainly of hypothetical (rather than
operational) interest, it is noteworthy that the rules treat strategic behavior by dominant
firms and entrants similarly: both are held to be objectionable. A restraint on ad-
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1. Lawful Behavior
1.1 Short Run: Q 5 Q
When dominant firms reduce their output or hold their (demand
adjusted) 12 1 output unchanged in the face of new entry they shall
be deemed to be behaving in a nonpredatory way provided that
the resulting market price is not less than average variable cost.'
1 22
missible entry behavior is thus indicated where an entrant with a deep pocket and the
requisite capital intensive technology attempts to subvert average variable cost pricing
rules with a strategic purpose.
121. See pp. 305-06 & note 33 supra for a discussion of demand adjustment.
122. A graphical display may be instructive. The short-run cost curves drawn below
show the average total, average variable, and corresponding marginal costs of the dominant
firm. The dominant firm is assumed initially to be producing at Qo and selling at a
price P. When entry occurs, the dominant firm is permitted under the proposed rules to
continue production at Q, provided that the resulting market price exdeeds Pv. If it does
not, he must reduce output. If at Q- the price still does not cover his costs, production
will presumably be discontinued (since out-of-pocket costs exceed revenues). This last
outcome is doubtful, however, since inability to cover minimum average variable costs
implies either massive inefficiency on the part of the dominant firm or a strong likeli-
hood that the new entrant is behaving in a predatory way (in which event the dominant
firm is entitled to relief).
Note that whereas an average variable cost proviso is actually more permissive than a
marginal cost pricing test (AVG is less than SRMC in the relevant region Qx to Qo), the
output restrictions severely limit the range of action open to the dominant firm. Areeda
and Turner's (surrogate) rules would allow the dominant firm to expand beyond Qo
provided that prices recovered variable costs.
Price,
Cost
SRMC
I--- AVG
p-------------
P----- ------- IPx /
Ox 0o Quantity (0)
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1.2 Long Run
Prices calculated to recover full costs over a sustained production
interval, during which plant renewal and other expenses come
due, will be deemed nonpredatory. 123
The rationale for rule 1.2 is that output limits placed on the
dominant firm in the short run are less easily justified, and more
difficult to police, in the long run. When entrants have incurred the
threshold costs of entry and have not been rendered nonviable by
short-run strategic responses of dominant firms, they ought to be well
positioned to participate in industry growth, achieve cost economies,
and compete effectively. The restrictions on output expansion stipu-
lated in rule 1.1 above are accordingly relaxed in the long run and are
supplanted by an average total cost remunerative pricing rule.
2. Unlawful Behavior
2.1 Short Run: Q > Q
Dominant firms that expand their (demand adjusted) output in
the face of new entry will be deemed to be engaged in predatory
behavior-even if the resulting market price exceeds the dominant
firm's average variable cost.
2.2 Long Run
Sustained production by dominant firms or successful entrants
shall be deemed predatory if revenues are not fully cost recovering
with respect to an appropriate assignment of all expenses incurred
during the long-run interval.
Rule 1.1 is the basic rule. It does not disallow a conciliatory
response, since accommodating output reductions are permitted. A
conciliatory response is not mandated, however, except where the
dominant firm is a high-cost supplier or the market-clearing price,
were output to remain unchanged, would be less than the dominant
firm's corresponding average variable costs. But the entering firm has
no reason to anticipate that entry will be accommodated. To the con-
trary, the normal expectation is that such output as the entrant brings
to the market will augment market supply in precisely that amount.
Put differently, the dominant firm will not be expected to make a
place for the new entrant by reducing its output in a partially or fully
offsetting degree. The new entrant must thus be prepared to compete
123. The long-run rule applies to dominant firms and successful entrants alike. As
discussed at pp. 295-96 supra, 12 to 18 months would appear to be a sufficient period for
the output rule to govern.
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with the dominant firm at a common post-entry price below the
prevailing pre-entry price. Rule 1.2 applies to the longer run and
permits output expansion provided that the resulting prices fully re-
cover cost.
Rule 2.1 is the counterpart of rule 1.1. Areeda and Turner would
permit output expansion in the immediate post-entry interval if the
resulting market price exceeds the dominant firm's marginal (or
average variable) cost. Rule 2.1 prohibits output expansion. The wel-
fare losses attributable to rules that permit contingent expansions of
output are thereby avoided. (Dominant firms have an incentive to
price higher and supply on inefficient terms in the pre-entry period
if a positive output reaction is permitted. Aggregate post-entry product
is also supplied at a higher cost under Areeda-Turner rules.)
The proposed rules are also superior in relative ease of enforcement.
The Areeda-Turner rule, which permits output expansion, crucially
relies on a price-to-cost test, which is exceedingly difficult to apply.'
124
The proposed rule, by contrast, is much simpler: Any (demand ad-
justed) output increase by the dominant firm is deemed predatory.
This is a much easier test statistic to develop.
12-
Rule 2.2 is concerned with behavior during the time period after
the output restraint has expired. It makes allowance for the possibility
that dominant firms (or successful entrants) with deep pockets will
engage in long-term supply of a non-cost recovering kind in the hope
of eliminating rivals. Since supply can be sustained efficiently only
if infrastructure-renewing costs are incurred (maintenance, replace-
ment of plant and equipment, labor training costs, etc.), these costs
should be taken into account in judging whether product is being
supplied on economical terms. If these expenses are not being covered
in the long run, a presumption of unlawfulness is warranted.
No special rule of law is needed to cover the generational equip-
ment case discussed in Part III. An entering firm should expect the
dominant firm to sell its existing stock of equipment under the best
124. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 190-91; Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 716-18,
733; Cooper, supra note 3, at 438.
125. The proposed short-run rule does include a variable cost proviso. A litigated case
in which the dominant firm maintains or reduces output will thus require an examina-
tion of average variable costs. I would expect, however, that a major consequence of
adopting the proposed rules would be a sharp drop in the number of litigated cases.
Dominant firms will simply not respond aggressively to entry, and there is a presump-
tion that nonresponse (holding output unchanged) is lawful. Except as market price falls
drastically because of entry, the average variable cost floor is not apt to be breached
(though this is more likely in highly labor-intensive industries). By contrast, dominant
firms that increase output (as the Areeda-Turner rules permit) in a region of increasing
marginal (and variable) cost are more apt to occasion litigation.
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terms it can secure. If demand is inelastic the dominant firm may
well retire equipment when new supplies appear, thereby making a
place for the entrant. There should be no presumption, however, that
this will occur. To the contrary, the normal expectation is that the
dominant firm's entire stock will be marketed, in which case the new
product brought onto the market by an entrant will increase market
supplies by precisely the amount of the entrant's output.
Although these rules cover dominant firm reactive behavior, an
additional rule of law is required to cover the case where a firm (large
or small) is attempting to enter a new market.
3. With the exception of promotional terms offered for a very
short duration in conjunction with the sale of nondurable con-
sumer goods, a new entrant should be expected to offer product
on terms that are cost recovering.
Rule 3 allows the new entrant greater latitude by permitting very low
prices (even give-aways) for announcement purposes. The entrant can
thus encourage customers to try the product on an experimental basis.
This applies strictly to the short term. Part IV suggests some rough
guidelines for assessing the allowable duration for a promotional
campaign.
B. Established firms'
126
1. Lawful Behavior
Occasional price wars of very limited duration do not pose predatory
pricing threats to established oligopolists. Moreover, legal efforts to
eliminate such behavior easily contribute to tighter oligopolistic pric-
ing discipline. Accordingly, episodic price wars should be disregarded
by the law. Attention should instead be focused exclusively on sys-
tematic pricing behavior among oligopolists.
1.1 Intermediate Run
-(i) Normal: P t SRAC: Oligopolists charging prices that ex-
ceed short-run average costs shall be deemed to be behaving
in a nonpredatory manner.
(ii) Excess Supply: P t A VC: Oligopolists may reduce prices
to average variable cost levels under conditions of chronic
excess supply (such as develop in a declining industry).
126. The rules set out here apply to the case described as "loose oligopoly" at pp.
321-23 supra. Promotional pricing by new entrants, see pp. 324-25 supra, is covered by
rule 3. The growth industry case poses special problems of its own. The pertinent con-
siderations are set out at p. 320 supra.
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1.2 Long Run
Prices calculated to recover full costs over a sustained production in-
terval during which plant renewal and related expenses are incurred
will be deemed nonpredatory.
12 7
2. Unlawful Behavior
Successive price wars, even though each is of very short duration,
should be examined jointly rather than independently, in which case
the intermediate-run test described below is relevant.
2.1 Intermediate Run
(i) Normal: P < SRAC: Sustained or frequently recurring
pricing at less than short-run average costs will be deemed
predatory.
128
(ii) Excess Supply: P <A VC: Pricing at less than average
variable costs will be deemed predatory, even under condi-
tions of chronic excess supply.
2.2 Long Run
Sustained pricing that is not prospectively cost recovering will be
deemed predatory.
Since SRMC > SRA C > A VC when plant is operated beyond the
minimum cost point, for the normal case these rules are more permis-
sive than the SRMC rules of Areeda and Turner, but are more
restrictive than their average variable cost surrogate. This points up a
fact which, though apparent on reflection, warrants comment: A VC is
often a poor surrogate for short-run marginal cost. Applying the A VC
rule to the normal case allows much more output expansion than the
SRMC rule it is meant to approximate. 129 The proposed rules and
the Areeda-Turner rules are identical only for the declining industry
(excess supply) case.
VII. Fairness
The term predatory pricing reeks with implications of unfairness.
Curiously, however, the fairness aspect of predatory pricing rules has
127. Inasmuch as SRAC is everywhere greater than or equal to LRAC, the long-run
rule is redundant for the normal case. Lest the rules be misconstrued, however, the long
run is included both here and in rule 2.2 for completeness.
128. Where plants are operating beyond design capacities this is a more permissive
test for predatory behavior than a short-run marginal cost test.
129. As shown in the figure in note 122 supra, short-run marginal cost is equal to
average variable cost at the output Qx, but exceeds average variable costs at outputs
greater than Qv. This deviation, moreover, becomes progressively greater as output is
expanded. Average variable cost thus becomes a progressively less satisfactory surrogate for
marginal cost as output is increaed above Qo.
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received little attention in the recent literature. Partly this may be
because fairness among oligopolists is difficult to characterize and the
earlier literature complicated the task of characterization by failing to
distinguish the new entry from the established rivalry cases. Partly it
may be because fairness can be an obscure criterion.130
Deriving an "optimal" predatory pricing rule based on notions of
fairness poses formidable problems. A general criterion for assessing
fairness is needed, but broad agreement on such a criterion is lacking.
Although some might counsel that fairness be disregarded for this
reason, a less ambitious option warrants consideration. Rather than
derive the optimal rule, simply take the proposed rules as given and
ask whether there are recognizable fairness differences between them.
Comparative assessments of this kind are often feasible. 131 Since at-
titudes about fairness are apt to be stronger when relations between
new entrants and dominant firms are involved and since the analysis
has been primarily concerned with predatory pricing in the context
of new entry, these remarks on fairness will be restricted to the new
entry condition. It will be useful to consider the three broad classes
of rules that apply in the new entry case: the protectionist rule (P = P),
the contingent supply rule (P = MC), and the business as usual rule
(Q =Q).
A. Protectionist Rule
The protectionist rule is that the dominant firm must take whatever
actions are necessary to maintain market price when a new entrant
appears. It involves a simple substitution of product supplied by the
entrant for product previously supplied by the dominant firm. It
violates a seemingly reasonable rule of industrial justice, namely, that
entrants should expect to make their own way by offering incremental
product in open markets.
130. As Professor Cooper notes, "[d]irect evidence of subjective motivations is always
relevant in evaluating conduct, but inferences of motivation are ordinarily too dangerous
to be accorded substantial weight." He observes that the courts have repeatedly refused
to expand reliance on intent beyond this limited role, "instinctively recognizing that
efforts to control the 'fairness' of competition must encounter immense difficulties."
Cooper, supra note 3, at 454.
131. Note that the allocative efficiency advantage of the output restriction rule is a
comparative one. Among the predatory pricing rules that have been proposed and are
prospectively operational, it has the best properties. Some antitrust specialists will doubt-
lessly continue to favor "comprehensive appraisals" of the kind described by Scherer, see
note 16 supra. The efficiency and fairness properties of such an approach are prob-
lematic and, I think, unascertainable.
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B. Contingent Supply Rule
Of the possible bases for judging fairness, equality of opportunity is
an appealing criterion. Posner's test for predatory pricing, excluding
"only a less efficient competitor,"'132 would appear to qualify under
this standard. But this test misses the dynamics of the problem. Product
that could be supplied by an efficient dominant firm but is offered
only for purposes of defeating entry in markets where entry appears
and deterring entry elsewhere is surely not equivalent to product sup-
plied on a regular basis. To the contrary, contingent supply of a gam-
ing variety-now it's there, now it isn't, depending on whether an en-
trant has appeared or perished-has the earmarks of a punitive purpose,
Simple open market offers of incremental product by new entrants are
not feasible when confronted by strategic behavior of this kind. It
seems reasonable to regard such actions as pernicious and to declare
them unfair and inadmissible.
C. Business as Usual
The business as usual rule (Q = Q) falls between the protectionist
rule (P = P, which implies Q < Q) and the contingent supply rule
(P = MC, which permits Q > Q) in severity. Under this rule the
dominant firm is advised that it can supply as much or as little as it
wants, but that it should be prepared to supply on a regular basis. If,
as seems reasonable, dominant firms have been supplying product
under conditions in which production, distribution, and marketing
are in balance, a continuation of the dominant firm's sup.ply is surely
inoffensive. Indeed, to expect someone to unbalance his operations
(due to indivisibilities), lay off experienced workers, and hold capacity
idle is tantamount to assigning a handicap to the established firm. Al-
though horse races may benefit from efforts to equalize chances, the
general presumption is that achievement should not be penalized.
Efforts to cripple one firm to benefit another are widely believed to
be unfair.
I conclude that fairness and efficiency both favor the Q = Q rule.
Such harmony is perhaps not unusual; but neither is it always the
case that what has the appearance of fairness and what contributes to
efficiency warrant similar or identical behavior. It is nevertheless more
satisfying when antitrust rules both yield consumer benefits (which is
132. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 193.
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what efficiency is mainly about) and do not conflict with norms of
industrial justice.
133
Conclusion
Predatory pricing rules must distinguish between meritorious claims
and claims that discourage legitimate rivalry..34 Professors Areeda and
Turner made a seminal contribution to the analysis of predatory
pricing by establishing that systematic economic analysis can be ap-
plied to the thorny issues posed by predatory pricing. The straight-
forward application of "settled" microeconomic propositions to public
policy can sometimes be hazardous, however. Caution is warranted
where the assumptions on which received doctrine is based are greatly
at variance with the real world circumstances under examination.
The specific issue that arises here is whether the allocative efficiency
benefits associated with continuous marginal cost pricing likewise
apply when such pricing is of a temporary, strategic kind. I submit
that marginal cost pricing loses its appeal when it is applied con-
tingently as a strategic deterrent to entry. The predatory pricing
problem needs to be formulated in strategic terms in order for the
effects of alternative pricing rules to be accurately displayed. Such an
analysis reveals that, when compared to the output rule proposed by
this article, the Areeda-Turner marginal cost rules result in losses of
social welfare in the periods before and after entry.
The output rule also has efficiency properties superior to other
cost-based rules and to umbrella pricing. It is no more difficult to
comprehend and is easier to apply than alternative cost-based rules.
Rudimentary considerations of fairness also favor the output restriction
rule over both cost-based and umbrella pricing rules. The output
restriction rule provides a practicable way to sort out meritorious from
protectionist claims of predatory behavior.
133. Restraints on promotional pricing also have a fairness rationale. Thus although
new entrant status may properly entitle a firm to a brief promotional interval during
which cost-recovering rules may be suspended, to ask for more is to rig the rules of the
game in favor of those who have deep pockets. This is patently unfair (and also inef-
ficient) and should be disallowed.
134. Professor Scherer offers a similar summary of the objectives of predatory pricing
law: "[t]he most workable competition in a [dominant firm industry] occurs when the
dominant firm fears that it cannot deter entry from a high-price posture and is therefore
led toward a continuing low-price, high-output strategy, recognizing inter alia that no
rules will force it to make room if entry does occur." Scherer, Some Last Words on
Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. Ryv. 901, 902 (1976). But while it is relatively easy to
reach agreement that these are the purposes to be served, designing a set of rules that
are not defective in pre-entry or post-entry respects is quite another matter.
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